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REGULATING BLACK-BOX MEDICINE
W. Nicholson Price II*
Data drive modern medicine. And our tools to analyze those data are growing
ever more powerful. As health data are collected in greater and greater
amounts, sophisticated algorithms based on those data can drive medical innovation, improve the process of care, and increase efficiency. Those algorithms, however, vary widely in quality. Some are accurate and powerful,
while others may be riddled with errors or based on faulty science. When an
opaque algorithm recommends an insulin dose to a diabetic patient, how do
we know that dose is correct? Patients, providers, and insurers face substantial
difficulties in identifying high-quality algorithms; they lack both expertise and
proprietary information. How should we ensure that medical algorithms are
safe and effective?
Medical algorithms need regulatory oversight, but that oversight must be appropriately tailored. Unfortunately, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
has suggested that it will regulate algorithms under its traditional framework,
a relatively rigid system that is likely to stifle innovation and to block the
development of more flexible, current algorithms.
This Article draws upon ideas from the new governance movement to suggest
a different path. FDA should pursue a more adaptive regulatory approach
with requirements that developers disclose information underlying their algorithms. Disclosure would allow FDA oversight to be supplemented with evaluation by providers, hospitals, and insurers. This collaborative approach would
supplement the agency’s review with ongoing real-world feedback from sophisticated market actors. Medical algorithms have tremendous potential, but ensuring that such potential is developed in high-quality ways demands a careful
balancing between public and private oversight, and a role for FDA that mediates—but does not dominate—the rapidly developing industry.
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Introduction
Trauma patients often die from catastrophic hemorrhages.1 If doctors
and nurses are nearby to intervene promptly, death can frequently be prevented. But there are many patients, and it takes an observing expert to
know when to intervene. How can we reduce these deaths? An emerging
solution relies on computation—sophisticated algorithms that can find patterns in continuously monitored vital signs and call providers before it’s too
late.2
1. Nehemiah T. Liu et al., Development and Validation of a Machine Learning Algorithm
and Hybrid System to Predict the Need for Life-Saving Interventions in Trauma Patients, 52 Med.
& Biological Engineering & Computing 193, 193 (2014).
2. Id. at 193–94.
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Medicine increasingly turns to algorithms to solve complex health
problems. What pattern among a set of thousands of genes predicts which
lung tumors will respond to treatment? How should scarce resources like
inpatient beds be allocated to optimize patient care among patients with
different illnesses and prognoses? What facial features can identify genetic
disorders and suggest early interventions? More generally, how can algorithms be used to save lives and reduce suffering by improving medical practice? Sophisticated techniques are being developed to examine vast troves of
health data, including genetic sequences, metabolic screens, and electronic
health records, in search of answers to these and other questions. Frequently,
these algorithms are opaque even to their developers, who may know that
something reproducibly works, but not how or why.
This Article builds on my previous work introducing and analyzing this
form of “black-box medicine” by canvassing current implementations and
then asking: How should algorithmic medicine—that is, the use of such algorithms to guide care—be regulated? If providers rely on a trauma-monitoring algorithm that misses signs a provider could have observed, trauma
patients might die from hemorrhage before anyone notices. Algorithms that
predict the wrong drug to treat a cancer could waste months and hundreds
of thousands of dollars on ineffective treatments. And if algorithms allocate
hospital beds ineffectively, patients that need the resources most may not get
them.
Patients and providers must trust that algorithms are safe and effective
to rely on them, but they lack the experience or knowledge to evaluate algorithms at the point of care, creating a need for systemic regulation. Regulation can help but must walk a fine line: demonstrating safety and efficacy
without destroying the flexibility and ongoing innovation that drive algorithmic medicine’s development.
FDA is moving to regulate medical algorithms but looks to be moving in
the wrong direction. In 2014, FDA proposed that complex laboratory-developed diagnostic tests should be subject to the same preapproval regime currently used to evaluate commercially sold diagnostic kits.3 Under this
regime, diagnostic tests, including algorithmic medicine, would be categorized by risk and then subjected to according regulatory scrutiny; complex
algorithms would typically face the heaviest scrutiny and would require
clinical testing and preapproval.4 This regulatory model is poorly suited to
drive the accurate, rapid, and safe development of algorithmic medicine.
Algorithms can be developed quickly and tailored to the particular needs of
health systems and patient groups. Furthermore, at least some algorithms
evolve as they incorporate new data and learn to more accurately predict
3. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Anticipated Details of the Draft Guidance for
Industry, Food and Drug Administration Staff, and Clinical Laboratories: Framework for Regulatory Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests (LDTs) (2014) [hereinafter FDA, LDT Draft Guidance], http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/
ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/UCM407409.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CLALHRM].
4. See infra Section III.D.2.
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relevant outcomes. Clinical-trial-based preapproval regimes—typically
costly, slow, and designed for unchanging products—circumscribe these
strengths. Rigidly imposing such a regime on algorithms would substantially
slow their development and adoption.
This is not to argue that FDA should have no role in regulating algorithmic medicine. FDA has traditionally taken a command-and-control
approach, exercising centralized authority to impose requirements for industry before allowing market access, and some elements of that approach
are justified here.5 In high-risk situations, moderate FDA preapproval requirements may be appropriate. In lower-risk situations, however, more
modest registration requirements should suffice. In either case, robust
postmarket surveillance will help ensure safety and quality as algorithms are
developed and deployed in clinical practice. In general, more light-touch,
iterative, adaptive regulation is likely to promote growth and innovation in
the field.6
But command-and-control is not enough; FDA should consider adopting a collaborative governance approach in this area. Other evaluators, such
as insurers, hospital systems, and providers, can and should be involved in
helping to evaluate algorithms continually as they are implemented and used
in clinical practice.7 For these evaluators to help provide parallel oversight,
they need information, and here FDA can play a central role by mediating
the distribution of that information. FDA could require developers to disclose accurate information about their algorithms and could then mediate
sharing of that information to insurers, hospitals, or providers. Algorithmic
medicine demands a more flexible web of regulatory oversight to bring safe
and effective algorithms to patients, providers, and the health system as a
whole. In considering solutions, the new governance literature emerges as
relevant, offering insights on how collaboration among multiple health care
market participants may be useful for optimal oversight of complex medical
algorithms.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I describes medical algorithms,
considers examples of current implementations, and lays out the overlapping subcategories of mobile-health algorithms and black-box algorithms.
Part II asks why medical algorithms need to be regulated at all and, in the
process, considers challenges faced by health-care market actors in evaluating medical algorithms in the absence of centralized regulatory authority.
Part III begins by analyzing the relatively complex bases of FDA’s regulatory

5. For a discussion on the background of FDA’s command-and-control approach to
regulation, see Eric R. Claeys, The Food and Drug Administration and the Command-and-Control Model of Regulation, 49 St. Louis U. L.J. 105 (2004).
6. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive
Management, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (2014) (describing adaptive regulation and administrative
law implications); see also infra Section V.C (describing the theory of “new governance”).
7. See generally Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1997) (describing collaborative public/private governance).
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authority over software. It then describes FDA’s existing and current approaches to regulation of medical algorithms, first canvassing FDA’s historical approaches to software and in vitro diagnostic device regulations, and
then considering FDA’s current approaches to mobile-health software and
laboratory-developed diagnostic tests. Part IV critiques aspects of current
approaches, noting the dangers of too-rigid as well as too-permissive regulation. Part V presents suggestions for reform. It draws on the new governance
literature to suggest possible approaches involving information forcing, collaborative governance, and iterative flexibility, but also suggests that FDA
should retain a good deal of centralized command-and-control authority. A
few brief thoughts conclude.
I. What Are Medical Algorithms?
Medical algorithms are, somewhat tautologically, algorithms used in
medicine. But since many decisionmaking processes can be described as algorithms,8 what I mean here is more specific: computer-based algorithms
that help make medical decisions or analyze medical information. Examples
include computer-aided diagnostics, such as a classifier that diagnoses melanoma from pictures of skin lesions;9 a program that evaluates a magnetic
resonance image (MRI) for the presence of a tumor;10 predictive analytics
programs that attempt to identify high-risk patients based on a host of factors before that risk actually materializes;11 diagnostic tests aimed at personalized medicine that calculate a drug dosage based on a patient’s weight, sex,
and genetic sequence;12 or smartphone apps that recommend diet choices
based on a patient’s exercise patterns combined with baseline medical information.13 In all these examples the central feature of the technology is an
8. Simpler algorithms, sometimes paper-based, have a long history in medicine. More
recently, efforts have been made to group, classify, and make available the spectrum of such
simpler algorithms. The Medical Algorithms Project collected thousands of medical algorithms
in the form of Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, see M. Sriram Iyengar & John R. Svirbely, The
Medical Algorithms Project (2009), https://arxiv.org/pdf/0908.0932.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3BWX-45G2], and has grown into Medal, a company with the same collection of algorithms
with mobile apps and over 130,000 users, see also Medal, http://www.medicalalgorithms.com
[https://perma.cc/7KYX-KCT4]. As older algorithms become more integrated with modern
technology, distinguishing between simpler, conceptually paper-based algorithms and modern
algorithms that require a computer becomes both more difficult and less important.
9. See Andre Esteva et al., Dermatologist-Level Classification of Skin Cancer with Deep
Neural Networks, 542 Nature 115 (2017).
10. See Shijun Wang & Ronald M. Summers, Machine Learning and Radiology, 16 Med.
Image Analysis 933 (2012).
11. See Alexander T. Janke et al., Exploring the Potential of Predictive Analytics and Big
Data in Emergency Care, 67 Annals Emergency Med. 227 (2016).
12. See Isaac S. Chan & Geoffrey S. Ginsburg, Personalized Medicine: Progress and Promise, 12 Ann. Rev. Genomics & Hum. Genetics 217 (2011) (describing dosing predictions for
warfarin and other drugs).
13. See, for example, MySymptoms, http://skygazerlabs.com/ [https://perma.cc/E35EZMR5], an app that tracks diet, exercise, symptoms, and other factors, and analyzes those data
for patterns.
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algorithm that analyzes information to tell patients or providers something
about a medical situation or to recommend a course of medical action or
inaction.
There are two types of algorithms involved in the process of using relationships in medical data to drive treatment. We might term the first a research algorithm—it is the process by which data are analyzed and
relationships are discovered. The second we might call a prediction algorithm—it is the process by which relationships are applied to new data to
generate predictions, recommendations, and the like. To take a very simple
example, suppose we wish to examine the relationship between blood pressure and heart failure, and we have a dataset of many patients’ blood pressure at the start of a year and whether they suffered heart failure during that
year. The research algorithm might be simply, “Order all patients by blood
pressure, separate them into ten groups by ascending average blood pressure, and calculate what fraction of each group experienced heart failure.”
We’d then have a table relating blood pressure ranges to likelihood of heart
failure. The prediction algorithm would incorporate this data to make a prediction based on new data: take a patient’s blood pressure, look up the relevant likelihood of heart failure in the table, and that’s the prediction for the
patient. In this Article, I am primarily examining the second type of algorithm, though in some of the techniques discussed here the two types
cannot be readily separated.
An additional complication relates to changes in algorithms. In some
cases, the algorithm may be static—that is, it is developed once and then
applied over and over again to new data about new patients. In other cases,
the algorithm itself evolves over time to improve its performance, incorporating new data as they are acquired.14 Helping the algorithm improve over
time is probably a good thing for the algorithm but makes it harder to regulate because the algorithm being regulated is a moving target. This Part goes
into more depth on medical algorithms, giving current examples in Section
I.A, then briefly describing two somewhat overlapping subphenomena: mobile-health applications in Section I.B, and inherently black-box algorithms,
the principal focus of this Article, in Section I.C.
A. Current Implementations
Algorithmic medicine is a rapidly developing field. This Section describes a few complex algorithms in use or development today, including
real-time patient-status analysis for hospital systems, monitoring devices
that constantly track and analyze individuals’ vital signs, and algorithms that
predict or early diagnose cancer based on complicated sets of measurable
biological characteristics.15
14. See infra Section IV.A.2.
15. This Article does not address the economics or business models of these development
models. In general, they could create value by improving the quality or efficiency of care, or by
identifying untapped opportunities for increased billing, as described throughout this Section.
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Some complex medical algorithms are designed to aggregate information about individual patients with contemporaneous information from
other sources in the health system. The company Lumiata aims to use “170
million data points to ‘transform’ data from insurance claims, electronic
medical records, medical sensors and other sources into information that
can be used to predict the best ways to treat individual patients and conditions.”16 The company’s algorithms integrate data from many sources with
information directly measured in or provided by the patient—including, potentially, through the use of wearable patient monitors17—to provide individual suggested diagnoses, predictions, and treatment recommendations.18
Lumiata’s system also suggests system-wide analytics, helping hospitals allocate resources to the patients who need them most—and also helping hospitals spot untapped billing opportunities.19
Daily measurements of individuals are also fodder that can be used to
develop medical algorithms and their associated devices. Apple’s iPhone collects data based on how the user moves throughout the day, and add-on
devices can measure heart rates or rhythms; Apple offers a ResearchKit that
enables these data to be connected to medical algorithms run by providers
or by the individuals themselves.20 In a more advanced tracker under development by the company Quanttus, a wristband blood-pressure monitor
tracks blood pressure through the day and while and individual sleeps, up to
10,000 data points per hour.21 The company’s current model is based on
For a description of difficulties in appropriating that increased value, see W. Nicholson Price
II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 Cardozo L. Rev. 1401 (2016).
16. Chris Rauber, Lumiata Nabs $6 Million for Personalized Medical Care Software, S.F.
Bus. Times (Sept. 11, 2014, 7:04 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/2014/09/
lumiata-6-million-funding-personalized-health-data.html [https://perma.cc/3PEGFQZV?type=image]. The company’s technology is based on a machine-learning based “Risk
Matrix” using “175 million patient-record years” to predict risk of 20 conditions based on
claims data, electronic health records, and other forms of medical data. See Press Release,
Lumiata, Lumiata Launches Its AI-Powered Risk Matrix that Improves Care Coordination and
Risk Management (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.lumiata.com/lumiata-launches-its-ai-poweredrisk-matrix-that-improves-care-coordination-and-risk-management-2/ [https://perma.cc/
7K4T-AM2V].
17. Scott Amyx, Wearing Your Intelligence: How to Apply Artificial Intelligence in
Wearables and IoT, Wired (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/12/wearingyour-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/2BBR-RDXQ].
18. Press Release, Lumiata, supra note 16.
19. See Product, Lumiata, http://www.lumiata.com/product/ [https://perma.cc/J5V9S85B] (noting that Lumiata can “[i]mprove population health care management” and “realize
earned reimbursements”).
20. See Chad Rudnick, 7 Medical Algorithms to Use with Apple ResearchKit Apps, Medal,
http://blog.medicalalgorithms.com/7-medical-algorithms-to-use-with-apple-researchkit-apps/
[https://perma.cc/TG4G-VSV4] (describing medical algorithms that can connect with the
iPhone via ResearchKit).
21. Vinod Khosla, The Reinvention of Medicine: Dr. Algorithm V0-7 and Beyond, TechCrunch (Sept. 22, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/09/22/the-reinvention-of-medicine-dralgorithm-version-0-7-and-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/Y2M9-DTMX].

428

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 116:421

tracking but it anticipates connecting the data to machine-learning algorithms at central servers to offer more complex predictive information to
patients.22
Medical algorithms can also take advantage of the rapidly advancing
ability to measure large numbers of biological markers in the human body.
Applied Proteomics is leveraging the power of proteomics—measuring the
proteins expressed by an individual—to develop new cancer tests.23 The
company intends to use its proteomics platform to predict and diagnose
other disease states,24 and can measure around 300,000 different markers
from a single blood test or even a dried blood spot.25 Once it determines the
level of large numbers of proteins, it uses a complex algorithm to determine
whether the patient has early-stage colorectal or pancreatic cancer.26
B. Mobile Health
Mobile health represents a tremendous area of growth and energy for
medical algorithms.27 Mobile health is worth describing separately for multiple reasons, but chiefly because FDA has treated it separately.28 As Nathan
Cortez has defined it, “ ‘Mobile health,’ or ‘mHealth,’ is the use of mobile
communications devices like smartphones and tablet computers for health
or medical purposes, usually for diagnosis, treatment, or simply well-being
and maintenance.”29 Mobile health sometimes uses specialized devices, but
more typically involves apps downloaded onto any number of mobile communications platforms.30 Many types of mobile-health applications exist,
with uses across the medical spectrum.31 Patient-focused apps range from
22. Rachel Metz, This Fitness Wristband Wants to Play Doctor, MIT Tech. Rev. (Feb. 19,
2014), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/524376/this-fitness-wristband-wants-to-playdoctor/ [https://perma.cc/C659-4PBX].
23. E.g., Jeffrey J. Jones et al., A Plasma-Based Protein Marker Panel for Colorectal Cancer
Detection Identified by Multiplex Targeted Mass Spectrometry, 15 Clinical Colorectal Cancer 186 (2016).
24. Pipeline, Applied Proteomics Inc., http://www.appliedproteomics.com/pipeline/
[https://perma.cc/6H23-VSNE].
25. See Khosla, supra note 21.
26. Press Release, Applied Proteomics Inc., Applied Proteomics Inc. Collaborates with
German Cancer Research Center to Discover and Develop New Cancer Diagnostic Tests (Oct.
9, 2013), http://appliedproteomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/2013_1009_api_GCRC_pr_1009.pdf [https://perma.cc/PM4F-7CYQ].
27. For a detailed account of mobile health, see Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health
Revolution?, 47 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1173 (2014) [hereinafter Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?]. For a brief overview of FDA regulation of mobile health technologies, see Nathan G.
Cortez et al., FDA Regulation of Mobile Health Technologies, 371 New Eng. J. Med. 372 (2014)
[hereinafter Cortez, FDA Regulation of Mobile Health].
28. See infra Section III.D.1.
29. Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at 1176.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 1181–90 (introducing an extensive typology of mHealth apps and classifying several types, with examples).
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simple tracking apps like step monitors to complex apps for controlling
FDA-regulated medical devices such as insulin pumps. Provider-focused
apps let smartphones remotely view hospital monitors or provide diagnostic
assistance. Apps aimed at both markets may allow remote viewing of CT
scans and MRIs or may attempt to discern problems in recorded body
sounds like heartbeats or lung sounds. In 2015, over 165,000 health-related
apps were offered to consumers in the Apple and Android app stores.32 Mobile-health applications are especially significant in the field of algorithmic
medicine because they are rapidly proliferating, and because they have already been the subject of substantial recent regulatory attention.33
This Article is principally concerned with those mHealth apps—
whether patient or provider focused—that use algorithms to monitor, suggest, diagnose, or otherwise process medical information. For instance, developing technologies include an app that analyzes facial features of infants
to identify genetic disorders as early as possible;34 an app that identifies autism in young children through eye tracking;35 and an app that tries to predict migraine attacks by using machine learning to analyze patterns of
triggers, symptoms, and physiological data and create individualized models.36 All of these revolve around embedded algorithms—in these cases,
black-box algorithms as described in the next Section. Other apps may simply provide remote access to patient data, or may record patient information; since these apps do not involve embedded algorithms in the same way,
I do not focus on them here.
C. Black-Box Medicine
Black-box medicine is “the use of opaque computational models to
make decisions related to health care”37 and is the focus of the remainder of
this Article. It is the subset of algorithmic medicine where the algorithms are
32. Things Are Looking App, Economist (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.economist.com/
news/business/21694523-mobile-health-apps-are-becoming-more-capable-and-potentiallyrather-useful-things-are-looking [https://perma.cc/V2E5-9P4M].
33. See infra Section III.D.1.
34. Face2Gene, https://suite.face2gene.com [https://perma.cc/Y6TL-ZHBJ]; see also
Megan Molteni, Thanks to AI, Computers Can Now See Your Health Problems, Wired (Jan. 9,
2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/computers-can-tell-glance-youve-got-genetic
-disorders/ [https://perma.cc/H9QX-RWWW].
35. Autism, RightEye, https://www.righteye.com/tests-therapies/autism [https://perma.
cc/RYU6-MBYB].
36. Second Opinion Health, the developer of the Migraine Alert app, is currently recruiting participants for a clinical trial to test its app in collaboration with the Mayo Clinic and
Allergan. Individualized Prediction of Migraine Attacks Using a Mobile Phone App and Fitbit
(Migraine Alert), ClinicalTrials.gov, https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT02910921
[https://perma.cc/7PBC-CFUT].
37. W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 419, 421, 429–34
(2015) (introducing the concept of black-box medicine and exploring some of its policy
implications).
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unavoidably opaque, whether those algorithms are used in an mHealth context or in other systems. Typically, such algorithms are derived from large
datasets of health information using sophisticated machine-learning techniques and reflect complex underlying biological relationships. Algorithms
can be opaque for multiple reasons. Sometimes, algorithms are nontransparent because, while they may rely on explicit rules, those rules are too complex for us to explicitly understand—for example, patients whose
measurements place them in a particular region of n-dimensional (where n
is large) characteristic-space are at a higher risk of stroke. In particular, these
rules may be impossible to explain or to understand by following the process
of scientific/medical discovery: mechanistic lab experiments followed by
confirmatory clinical trials.38 Other times, the relationships used in a blackbox algorithm are literally unknowable because of the machine-learning
techniques employed—that is, no one, not even those who programmed the
machine-learning process, knows exactly what factors go into the ultimate
decisions.39 A key distinguishing feature of black-box algorithms, as the term
is used here, is that it refers to algorithms that are inherently black box (i.e.,
their developers cannot share the details of how the algorithm works in practice)—rather than to algorithms that are deliberately black box (i.e., their
developers will not share the details of how the algorithm works).40 Blackbox algorithms are especially likely to evolve over time as they incorporate
new data into an integrated process of learning-and-applying.41
To understand black-box machine learning, take an example familiar
from daily use in nonmedical contexts: image-recognition technology.
Humans are very good at recognizing images, but it is hard to explain exactly what features of an image allow someone to recognize the subject. It is
easy to look at a picture of a duck and say, “That’s a duck.” It is easy because
we have seen many pictures of ducks—indeed, likely, many ducks—and
know what ducks look like. But it is hard to state what a picture of a duck
looks like with enough precision to tell someone who has never seen one to
accurately and consistently identify one.42 And it is very hard to tell a computer, hyperliteral and without any relevant experience, how to perform that
task. But computers can learn how to do this; for everyday examples, we
38. Id. at 434; see Jenna Burrell, How the Machine ‘Thinks’: Understanding Opacity in
Machine Learning Algorithms, Big Data & Soc’y, Jan.–June 2016, at 1, 5. Burrell notes that
opacity in machine-learning algorithms can be either deliberate (i.e., secrecy), the result of
technical illiteracy, or the result of the inherent incomprehensibility of machine-learning algorithms, Burrell, supra, at 1, and describes the third in some detail, id. at 5–9. I focus here on
the third definition: the inherent incomprehensibility of machine-learning algorithms and
their products.
39. Burrell, supra note 38, at 4–5.
40. For an excellent description of challenges with deliberately black-box algorithms in
other contexts, see Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms
that Control Money and Information (2015).
41. See infra Section IV.A.2.
42. The curious reader may find the exercise enlightening.
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need look no further than Google Image Search, which algorithmically identifies the subjects of images. Image-recognition algorithms are black-box
machine-learning algorithms—a classifier is presented with a set of known
images (“Here are 10,000 pictures of ducks”), develops complex internal
rules based on nonlinear processes, tests those rules on a test set (“Which of
these are ducks?”), adjusts the internal rules based on the success of the test,
and repeats the process until it can accurately and consistently classify the
images.43 But at the end of the process, the computer can no more tell us
how to identify a picture of a duck than we could tell it.
Computer algorithms can try to classify medical images in the same
way.44 Billions of medical images are taken each year, including MRIs, CAT
scans, and x-rays. These images are interpreted by trained practitioners, typically radiologists, but their interpretations are expensive, time consuming,
and have a relatively high error rate.45 Algorithms that can classify radiological images are accordingly an area of significant research, though less substantially integrated into current clinical practice.46
To clarify, not all complex medical algorithms are black box. Any of the
types of medical algorithms discussed above can be black-box algorithms,
depending on how they are developed. Classifiers may be based on explicit
characteristics (e.g., “if a yellow circle is surrounded by blue, it is the sun”;
“in a brain MRI, an intense contiguous mass in the middle of the brain
spanning the two hemispheres can be classified as the corpus callosum”).47
But these types of explicit rules work best for well-understood, simple characteristics and deal much less well with the complex relationships at the
heart of much biology and medicine. Typically, black-box algorithms are
most valuable for situations where the underlying scientific/medical relationships are especially complex, such that identifying and making these relationships explicit is overly difficult, very time consuming, or, in many
circumstances, impossible with current tools—such as the relationships
among thousands of genes or networks of environmental factors.
43. See Gang Wang et al., Learning Image Similarity from Flickr Groups Using Fast Kernel
Machines, 34 IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis & Machine Intelligence 2177
(2012) (describing a support vector machine method of classifying images from the imagesharing website Flickr by observing images in user-set groups (including sunsets, boats, penguins, and—indeed—ducks), learning, and predicting the likelihood that a future image will
belong to that group).
44. See Wang & Summers, supra note 10.
45. Leonard Berlin, Radiologic Errors, Past, Present and Future, 1 Diagnosis 79 (2014)
(noting persistent error rates of around 30% in radiological image interpretation, with roughly
70% perceptual errors (i.e., not seeing an abnormality) and 30% cognitive errors (i.e., failing
to assign the correct significance to a perceived abnormality)).
46. See Wang & Summers, supra note 10, at 946–47. Unsurprisingly, many radiologists
are reluctant to embrace a technology that would automate one of their primary tasks. See
Megan Molteni, If You Look at X-Rays or Moles for a Living, AI Is Coming for Your Job, Wired
(Jan. 25, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/look-x-rays-moles-living-ai-com
ing-job/ [https://perma.cc/UN3F-X73J].
47. See Alain Pitiot et al., Expert Knowledge-Guided Segmentation System for Brain MRI,
23 NeuroImage S85, S90–91 (2004).
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II. The Need for Regulation
Why does algorithmic medicine need to be regulated at all? The default
for new technologies—at least in the free-market-based United States—is
the absence of regulatory authority; if a producer wants to make something
available and consumers wish to purchase it, that is the end of the story,
barring some reason to deviate from the baseline.48 Regulation in the form
of premarket approval is especially rare. Drugs and medical devices are key
examples of such premarket approval, for well-explored reasons relating to
the status of health-care products as credence goods, whose efficacy must
generally be taken on faith—or, more accurately, on the word of those with
more knowledge.49 This Section retells this familiar story in the context of
algorithmic medicine.
As a prefatory note, I recognize that this discussion assumes a relatively
neutral status quo ante—that is, that current medical practice is a neutral
backdrop against which to consider the addition of medical algorithms. But,
of course, current medical practice is rife with its own challenges, inaccuracies, and opacity.50 Avoiding the implementation of algorithms because we
fear the problems that might arise means leaving in place a system of medical errors that we know already exist, and foregoing the potential benefits of
innovative treatment options that can save lives. Nevertheless, our medicaltechnology system tends to evaluate the adoption of new technologies
against the backdrop of current practice. As a result, while I make the case
for regulation here, that regulation should not be pursued as if the status
quo were perfect. Later Parts attempt to address this balancing act.51 For
now, however, I present the case for regulation.
The quality and choice of medical algorithms can have substantial effects on the welfare of patients. Using a poor-quality algorithm52 to direct
48. In Europe, by contrast, the precautionary principle is applied in many circumstances,
generally counseling against the adoption of a new technology that may have risks unless and
until those risks are proven to be minimal or nonexistent. See Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of
Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle 13 (2005) (“[I]t has become standard to say
that with respect to risks, Europe and the United States can be distinguished along a single
axis: Europe accepts the Precautionary Principle, and the United States does not.”).
49. See Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 26–29 (1982) (noting information failures as a justification and invoking the examples of drugs and doctors); see also Uwe
Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods, 44 J. Econ. Lit. 5, 5–8 (2006).
50. See Inst. of Med. of the Nat’l Acads., To Err is Human: Building a Safer
Health System (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
51. See infra Parts IV, V.
52. How exactly to define the quality of an algorithm is itself a substantial challenge. I
rely here on an operationalized definition—that is, a high-quality algorithm gives safe and
effective recommendations or accurate, useful predictions, and a low-quality algorithm does
not. But how to practically measure that quality may be hard, and the quality of the prediction
algorithm may depend, of course, on the quality of both the incoming data and research
algorithm. See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Big Bad Data: Law, Public Health,
and Biomedical Databases, 41 J.L. Med. & Ethics 56, 57 (2013) (noting quality problems in
medical big data). These questions are outside the scope of this paper.
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care can result in a decision not to seek care when care is actually necessary,
using a useless drug instead of one that might make a difference,53 or even
receiving fatal doses of radiation therapy.54 On the other hand, high-quality
algorithms can improve the quality of health care by reducing errors and
generating better outcomes55 and reduce costs by better targeting care and
avoiding unnecessary treatment.56
But it is hard to know which algorithms are high quality. Ideally, purchasers can adequately and efficiently evaluate product quality in the marketplace, and they can choose to purchase only high-quality goods (or to
accept a corresponding discount for lower quality goods). And ideally, producers guarantee the quality of their own products and send credible signals
of that quality—but producers often face problematic incentives that limit
our trust in their own evaluations.57 Complex medical algorithms are generally hard for others to evaluate: their inner workings are (by definition) either complex or actually opaque, and in many circumstances, information
about how they are developed and validated is kept secret.58
These barriers present challenges for those who might evaluate medical
algorithms and suggest the need for regulation. Patients provide the most
obvious parallel to consumers in ordinary technology purchases. Medical
technology is, after all, designed to help patients. Patients, however, are not
typically called upon to be informed consumers of medical technology in
general, and especially not medical algorithms. They lack the training to
evaluate information, even if it were available, and having each patient evaluate algorithms is much less efficient than some more centralized evaluator
or evaluators. For patients, medical algorithms, like many other medical
technologies, are “credence goods” that they cannot evaluate on their own.59

53. For example, some breast cancer patients that overexpress the HER2/neu receptor
may be successfully treated with Herceptin (trastuzumab), while for other patients the side
effects may outweigh the benefits. See Walter P. Carney, HER2 Status Is an Important Biomarker in Guiding Personalized HER2 Therapy, 2 Personalized Med. 317, 317–18 (2005);
Melinda L. Telli et al., Trastuzumab-Related Cardiotoxicity: Calling into Question the Concept of
Reversibility, 25 J. Clinical Oncology 3525, 3531 (2007).
54. See Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at 1218–19 (citing Nancy
G. Leveson, Safeware: System Safety and Computers app. A (1995)); infra Section III.C.1
(discussing Therac-25). Such errors may be exacerbated by the tendency of decisionmakers to
accept the recommendations of automated systems, see Linda J. Skitka et al., Does Automation
Bias Decision-Making?, 51 Int’l J. Hum.-Computer Stud. 991 (1999), though of course such
a bias is more understandable in the context of opaque algorithms.
55. See Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at 1192–95.
56. See I. Glenn Cohen et al., The Legal and Ethical Concerns that Arise from Using Complex Predictive Analytics in Health Care, 33 Health Aff. 1139, 1139 (2014); Cortez, The Mobile
Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at 1195–97.
57. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488, 488 (1970).
58. See infra Section II.B.
59. See Dulleck & Kerschbamer, supra note 49.
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Notably, despite this challenge, many mHealth apps, including some relying on black-box algorithms, are marketed directly to consumers or patients;60 this bolsters the need for rigorous evaluation. For instance, apps
used to calculate insulin dosages can be used directly by patients with diabetes yet have frequently suffered from calculation errors.61 Medical algorithms
and mHealth apps that are deliberately consumer facing may need additional controls or demonstrations that they are suitable for unmediated use,
beyond the regulatory mechanisms suggested throughout the remainder of
this Article.62
Where patients are unlikely to be able to participate effectively in evaluating the quality of complex medical algorithms, other actors in the health
system—such as providers, hospitals, or insurers—might. This Part discusses the general hurdles encountered in evaluating these technologies.
Later I discuss the role these entities could play, if these challenges were overcome, in engaging in collaborative regulation of algorithms.63
A. Inherent Complexity and Opacity
The biggest challenge in evaluating complex medical algorithms is definitional: they are complicated and often fully opaque.64 Put simply, we use
the tools of scientific understanding and clinical trials—including, ideally,
comparative effectiveness trials—to choose whether, when, and which medical technologies to apply. But these methods just don’t work well to evaluate
quality for many complex medical algorithms.
60. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
61. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
62. Although this Article will not attempt to flesh out regulatory additions for consumer-facing black-box algorithms, two relevant contexts might provide some guidance: direct-to-consumer genetic testing and the process of making formerly prescription drugs
available over the counter. For the former, see Kayte Spector-Bagdady & Elizabeth Pike, Consuming Genomics: Regulating Direct-to-Consumer Genetic and Genomic Information, 92 Neb. L.
Rev. 677, 697–742 (2014). For the latter, see Holly M. Spencer, Comment, The Rx-to-OTC
Switch of Claritin, Allegra, and Zyrtec: An Unprecedented FDA Response to Petitioners and the
Protection of Public Health, 51 Am. U. L. Rev. 999, 1011–18 (2002).
63. See infra Section V.C. This Article does not address the potential for product quality
incentives driven by the tort system, which faces complicated issues in the context of complex
medical algorithms. The combination of the learned intermediary doctrine (shielding medical
product manufacturers from liability when well-informed providers direct treatment) and federal preemption of tort law suits against FDA-approved products makes the tort system a
precarious source of direct incentives for product quality for medical software. See, e.g., Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at 1218–19; Michael Greenberg & M. Susan
Ridgely, Clinical Decision Support and Malpractice Risk, 306 JAMA 90, 90 (2011); Arnold J.
Rosoff, On Being a Physician in the Electronic Age: Peering into the Mists at Point-&-Click
Medicine, 46 St. Louis U. L.J. 111 (2002). In addition, many makers of medical information
technology routinely use “hold-harmless” clauses in contracts with physicians to further limit
liability. See Ross Koppel & David Kreda, Health Care Information Technology Vendors’ “Hold
Harmless” Clause: Implications for Patients and Clinicians, 301 JAMA 1276 (2009). These complex issues are beyond the scope of this Article, and remain the subject of future work.
64. See supra Section I.C.
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As described above, machine-learning methods often leave the mechanisms in the resulting algorithms fully opaque; even when they are not, they
are likely so complex as to defy understanding.65 Drugs and traditional medical devices are different; typically, we understand a significant amount
about how they work.66 This understanding can be used to evaluate the
product and choose between products. But when medical algorithms are
opaque or too complex to understand, this method of evaluation is substantially limited.67 And while some algorithms may involve clinical trials for
final validation, many will not for various reasons I have detailed
previously.68
B. Lack of Procedural Information
A key, related challenge is that the information useful to evaluate medical algorithms is often kept secret.69 Although, as described above, many
complex medical algorithms have inherently incomprehensible internal
workings, other information can be used to evaluate them externally. Such
information could include how the algorithms were developed, how they
were validated, and, perhaps most usefully, the data on which they were
trained.
In the context of drugs and many devices, information about how the
drugs were developed and validated is developed and distributed as part of
FDA’s regulatory process.70 Indeed, creating such information is a key
65. See supra Section I.C.
66. See Price, supra note 37, at 440–41. We certainly do not understand how all medical
interventions work. See id. at 440 n.92.
67. See id. at 441.
68. See Roger A. Ford & W. Nicholson Price II, Privacy and Accountability in Black-Box
Medicine, 23 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 1, 16–20 (2016) (describing why clinical
trials do not work for many forms of black-box medicine, including the potential requirement
of hyper-specific sample populations and the conflict with black-box medicine’s goals of being
fast, cheap, and flexible).
69. This lack of information has implications beyond regulation and evaluation. One
related question, beyond the scope of this Article, is whether the standard for informed consent would need to change when providers use inevitably or deliberately opaque algorithms to
shape care.
70. See, e.g., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry: Clinical Studies
Section of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products—Content and Format 2 (2006) [hereinafter FDA, Label Guidance], http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm127534.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8Y5-3BSV]
(noting that a label “must discuss those clinical studies that facilitate an understanding of how
to use the drug safely and effectively. This is usually accomplished by providing concise, accurate summaries of information from studies concerning a drug’s effectiveness (and sometimes
safety) that practitioners consider important to clinical decision making”). The guidance also
notes that clinical studies that show different effects in different subpopulations or different
clinical settings should also be summarized. Id. There are exceptions; many medical devices are
not independently shown to be safe and effective, but instead are shown to be equivalent to
products already on the market. There are substantial criticisms of this approval mechanism,
but at least the aim is to allow only safe and effective devices on the market. See, e.g., Diana M.
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justification for FDA’s preapproval regime.71 While providers may not typically read the clinical-trial reports of all the drugs they prescribe, the information is available should they choose to use it, and some do. And that
information is certainly available to others who evaluate medical products in
different contexts, including hospitals and insurers. Perhaps most importantly, this information is aggregated and analyzed by those with the relevant expertise, in the form of practice guidelines or other recommendation
documents.72
This type of procedural information is less available for medical algorithms. First, information about how medical algorithms are developed
looks substantially different from the clinical-trial data to which providers,
insurers, and hospitals are accustomed. But developers of medical algorithms—especially those sold in the context of health software systems—
keep information about those algorithms secret as a way to preserve competitive advantage.73 This information can include algorithms’ development,
implementation, flaws, and weaknesses.74 Even when providers gain independent experience about how algorithms perform in their own health-care
settings, they may be kept from sharing that experience under nondisclosure
agreements imposed by algorithm developers.75 The lack of procedural information makes it substantially harder for players in the health-care system
to evaluate medical algorithms.76 Overall, black-box algorithms appear to be
an appropriate subject of regulation. They have the potential to substantially
shape medical practice for individual patients but face real difficulties in
Zuckerman et al., Medical Device Recalls and FDA Approval Process, 171 Archives Internal
Med. 1006 (2011).
71. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 Mich.
Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 345, 366–72 (2007).
72. See, e.g., Nathan R. Every et al., Critical Pathways: A Review, 101 Circulation 461
(2000); Jeremy M. Grimshaw & Ian T. Russel, Effect of Clinical Guidelines on Medical Practice:
A Systematic Review of Rigorous Evaluations, 342 Lancet 1317 (1993).
73. Koppel & Kreda, supra note 63, at 1277; see also Price, supra note 15, at 1432–36
(describing the use of trade secrecy as a market exclusivity mechanism for black-box
algorithms).
74. Koppel & Kreda, supra note 63, at 1277.
75. Id. A countervailing factor might be the reluctance of providers to adopt new technology without the ability to see how their peers are using it, shaped at least partially by
malpractice risks from going outside the standard of care. As noted above at note 63, this
Article does not address tort considerations in detail. For further consideration of the potential
malpractice risks that might be faced by providers and health systems adopting, using, or
failing to adopt black-box algorithms, see W. Nicholson Price II, Medical Malpractice and
Black-Box Medicine, in Big Data, Health Law, and Bioethics (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2910417 [https://
perma.cc/FU9S-PMWW].
76. This lack of information has implications beyond regulation and evaluation. Although beyond the scope of this Article, deliberately or inevitably opaque algorithms that
direct medical care may have implications for informed consent, either—most directly—because providers must disclose that they are using a complex algorithm they do not understand
or—more controversially—because use of undisclosed algorithms actually requires a different
conception of consent before adoption.
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evaluation by actors in the health market. The next Part therefore turns to
the role FDA plays in regulating related areas.
III. Existing Approaches
FDA is the primary regulator of medical technology, principally through
its premarket review of drugs and medical devices.77 And indeed, FDA is the
regulator that has done the most to regulate algorithmic medicine so far.
This Part briefly discusses the history of FDA regulation of algorithmic
medicine. First, it describes FDA’s general authority over medical devices
under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, and its baseline regulatory
process for approving medical devices. Second, it addresses the extent of
FDA’s authority to regulate standalone medical algorithms. Third, it describes FDA’s historical approach over the past few decades. Fourth and finally, it recounts recent changes in the agency’s approach to medical
technologies involving algorithms in two contexts: mobile health and laboratory-developed diagnostic tests.
A. FDA Regulation of Medical Devices
FDA has broad regulatory authority over “medical devices,” which are
defined as any “instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance,
implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article which is intended
for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals.”78
To determine whether products are medical devices, FDA must determine their intended use by looking to the objective intent of the manufacturer.79 Objective intent, as defined by FDA, can be determined by
examining any number of indicia including the product itself, manufacturer
77. Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at 1200–05. FDA is not the
only regulator which could potentially regulate medical algorithms. See id. at 1211–17 (discussing other potential regulators of mHealth algorithms); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 Admin. L. Rev. 83 (2017) (arguing for a new agency focused on regulating
algorithms). This Article focuses on FDA’s potential role as the most likely regulator of medical algorithms.
78. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012). The full statutory definition of a medical device is
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or
other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is—
(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States Pharmacopeia, or
any supplement to them,
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals,
and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action
within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not dependent upon being
metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended purposes.

Id.
79. Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at 1200–01.
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claims, marketing materials, distribution patterns, and consumer use of the
product.80
FDA regulates medical devices under a risk-based classification regime.81
Under this regime, all devices are subject to registration, listing, and adverseevent-reporting requirements. Low-risk devices (Class I) are subject only to
these requirements.82 High-risk devices (Class III) must be approved
through a full premarket-approval pathway (PMA),83 which typically involves clinical trials and the presentation of extensive evidence of safety and
efficacy to FDA.84 Moderate-risk devices (Class II), unsurprisingly, fit in the
middle; they can be cleared via a PMA or by demonstrating that they are
equivalent to an already-approved device through a process known as a
510(k), named after its authorizing statutory provision.85 The 510(k) notification process involves widely varying levels of regulatory scrutiny, ranging
from a quick review of a short filing to searching scrutiny of applications in
the thousands of pages.86 The vast majority of devices are cleared via this
process.87

80. 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (2016); Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at
1201. FDA has testified that it will not determine intended use based on actual use by doctors
or patients. Letter from Michele Mital, Acting Assoc. Comm’r for Legislation, to Tim Murphy,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, House
of Representatives 2 (Mar. 20, 2013), http:// www.genomicslawreport.com/wp-content/
uploads/2013/03/HousemHealthLetter.pdf [https://perma.cc/VV8Z-ATUD].
81. 21 C.F.R. § 860.
82. Id. § 860.3.
83. Id. § 860.3(c)(3).
84. See id.
85. Id. § 860.3(c)(2); see also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 510(k), 21 U.S.C.
§ 360(k) (2012). The 510(k) pathway can also occasionally be used to approve a medical device through a modified process where the device is recognized as different enough from a
precedent device to warrant a new categorization (under the categorization scheme of 21
C.F.R. pts. 862–892), but similar enough to allow 510(k) approval rather than a full PMA. See
Nathan Cortez, Analog Agency in a Digital World, in FDA in the Twenty-First Century:
The Challenges of Regulating Drugs and New Technologies 438, 446 (Holly Fernandez Lynch & I. Glenn Cohen eds., 2015) (describing the approval of the ingestible PillCam for
intestinal videos).
86. See Inst. of Med. of the Nat’l Acads., Public Health Effectiveness of the
FDA 510(k) Clearance Process: Balancing Patient Safety and Innovation: Workshop
Report 56 (Theresa Wizemann ed., 2010) (“It is common for a 510(k) submission to contain
hundreds or thousands of pages of documentation . . . .”); Content of a 510(k), U.S. Food &
Drug Admin., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketNotification510k/ucm142651.htm
[https://perma.cc/2MVT-W8YD] (noting the average 510(k) is thirty-five pages long);.
87. Inst. of Med. of the Nat’l Acads., Medical Devices and the Public’s Health:
FDA 510(k) Clearance Process at 35 Years 15, 85 (2011), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/
13150/medical-devices-and-the-publics-health-the-fda-510k-clearance [https://perma.cc/Y94JA8UE].
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B. Regulatory Authority over Algorithms
FDA likely has the authority to regulate most medical algorithms. To be
a regulable medical device, a product must meet the statutory definition
above, including that it be “intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or
other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals.”88 Many medical algorithms are explicitly
intended by their developer for use in the diagnosis, cure, treatment, or mitigation of disease or other conditions in humans and thus satisfy the intent
requirement of the definition.89
One might ask whether there is also a meaningful statutory requirement
that the medical device fall within the statutory categories of “instrument,
apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or
other similar or related article.”90 Algorithms and software do not fit obviously into those categories, which all seem to reference physical constructs.91
But the listed categories are quite broad, and “contrivance” at the very least
seems ambiguous enough that FDA’s interpretation of whether such products can be “devices” would be entitled to Chevron deference.92
That question may be moot. The 21st Century Cures Act, enacted in
December 2016, suggests that Congress intends certain medical software to
fall within the definition of a medical device. A section of the law entitled
“Clarifying Medical Software Regulation” lists a set of software functions
that are excluded from the definition of a medical device.93 This list includes
software for administrative support, wellness maintenance, electronic health
88. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(2) (2012).
89. See supra Part I.
90. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
91. A group of international regulators, including FDA representatives, have referred to
at least some types of software as medical devices. Int’l Med. Device Regulators Forum,
“Software as a Medical Device”: Possible Framework for Risk Categorization and
Corresponding Considerations 5, 13–15 (2014), http://www.imdrf.org/docs/imdrf/final/
technical/imdrf-tech-140918-samd-framework-risk-categorization-141013.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7C5E-XEQD] (describing software as a medical device and describing a potential
scheme for classifying such software by risk).
92. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h); see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984). A counterargument would be that all of the categories appear to contemplate
physical items, and that by the interpretive canon of ejusdem generis, authority over purely
nonphysical software or algorithms should not be assumed. See, e.g., Gooch v. United States,
297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936) (“The rule of ejusdem generis . . . limits general terms which follow
specific ones to matters similar to those specified.”).
93. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3060 (2016) (amending 21 U.S.C.
§ 360j (2012)). For a useful explanation of the statutory language from the perspective of
industry stakeholders, see Clinical Decision Support Coal., Voluntary Guidelines for
the Design of Clinical Decision Support Software to Assure the Central Role of
Healthcare Professionals in Clinical Decision-Making 20–26 (2017) [hereinafter CDS
Guidelines], http://cdscoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/CDS-3060-Guidelines032717-with-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3CN-BZN5] (draft guidelines prepared by the
CDS Coalition).
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records, and transferring and formatting medical information.94 This language suggests, though it does not make explicit, that other software does fall
within the definition of a medical device, because there would otherwise be
no need for the exclusion.95 In particular, the Act does not exclude from the
definition of a medical-device software functions that are “intended to interpret or analyze clinical laboratory test or other device data, results, and findings.”96 In a confusing circumlocution, the Act also separately excludes
software that analyzes medical information and supports or provides recommendations so long as the software enables providers “to independently review the basis for such recommendations so that it is not the intent that
such [providers] rely primarily on any of such recommendations to make a
clinical diagnosis or treatment decision regarding an individual patient.”97
Since black-box algorithms by definition cannot enable such independent
review of the basis for their recommendations, they would appear not to be
excluded from the definition of medical devices and thus are likely within
FDA’s regulatory authority.98
In many instances, the ambiguity over whether a certain algorithm is
itself within FDA’s regulatory authority may not matter. Whether or not
FDA has authority to regulate algorithms as devices themselves under current law, it can often instead regulate them as accessories to associated medical devices, such as monitors, special-purpose medical computers, or
wearable medical devices, which certainly fall within the definition of a
device.99
FDA has since before the 21st Century Cures Act stated that at least
some types of medical software are medical devices, most recently in a 2015
94. § 3060(a) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 360j to add subsections (o)(1)(A)–(E)). This type
of software, which does not rely on algorithms, is outside the scope of this Article.
95. The fact that Congress excluded some software from the definition of algorithms is
not proof that Congress believed others to be included under the language of the FDCA, or
that such a belief would be accurate. Cf. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 644–48 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that Congress’ creation of a defense against
assertion of business methods patents in 35 U.S.C. § 273 did not indicate that business methods should be patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and that Congress may instead
have intended merely to limit fallout from a recent judicial interpretation of § 101, and
describing § 273 as “a red herring”).
96. § 3060(a).
97. Id.
98. But see CDS Guidelines, supra note 93. The draft guidelines suggest design principles to assure both that “healthcare professional users remain fully in control of their own
decision-making when using such software; and [that] such software is not regulated by FDA.”
Id. at 2 (emphasis added). The guidelines suggest that machine-learning-based software must
provide a physician with information about validation, databases, and limitations of machinelearning methods, and that this is sufficient to satisfy the “independent review” provisions of
the statute. Id. at 7, 10–11.
99. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Medical Device Accessories—Describing Accessories and Classification Pathway for New Accessory
Types: Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff 4–5 (2017),
https://www.fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-meddev-gen/documents/document/
ucm429672.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2V6-E33K].
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guidance document describing proposed regulation of mobile medical applications.100 It has applied this authority to software products used to analyze
patient data and generate patient-specific information. In one relatively recent example, FDA sent a warning letter in 2010 to Knome,101 a direct-toconsumer genetic testing firm (since acquired by Tute Genomics).102 FDA
stated that Knome’s product KnomeCOMPLETE, “a software program that
analyzes genetic test results that are generated by an external laboratory in
order to generate a patient specific test report . . . [was] a diagnostic device,”
referencing only the intended use of the software.103 To my knowledge, no
court has addressed the validity of such determinations.
Nonetheless, FDA’s authority to regulate the full range of complex medical algorithms remains somewhat contestable. FDA has long taken the position—and others have long understood—that it does not regulate the
practice of medicine.104 To the extent that using complex algorithms to make
predictions and direct patient care begins to look more like the practice of
100. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Mobile Medical Applications: Guidance for
Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff 6 (2015) [hereinafter FDA, Mobile
Medical App Guidance], http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/.../UCM263366.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E6TP-ENQN] (“Although the FDA has not issued an overarching software
policy, the Agency has formally classified certain types of software applications that meet the
definition of a device. . . . The FDA has previously clarified that when stand-alone software is
used to analyze medical device data, it has traditionally been regulated as an accessory to a
medical device or as medical device software.”). FDA is a member of the International Medical
Device Regulators, which works toward harmonizing medical device regulations around the
world. About IMDRF, Int’l Med. Device Regulators F., http://www.imdrf.org/about/
about.asp [https://perma.cc/QVS5-ETHZ]. The International Medical Device Regulators Forum has convened a working group to study Software as a Medical Device. See Int’l Med.
Device Regulators Forum, Software as a Medical Device (SaMD): Key Definitions
(2013), http://www.imdrf.org/docs/imdrf/final/technical/imdrf-tech-131209-samd-key-defini
tions-140901.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8HQ-73DP].
101. Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Ph.D., Ctr. for Device & Radiological Health, to Jorge
Conde, Co-Founder & Chief Exec. Officer, Knome, Inc. (June 10, 2010), https://www.fda.gov/
downloads/medicaldevices/resourcesforyou/industry/ucm215239.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GD499TG].
102. Reid Robison, Tute Genomics Acquires Knome, Tute Genomics (Nov. 2, 2015),
https://www.tutegenomics.com/news/tute-genomics-acquires-knome/ [https://perma.cc/
N74W-MP5T].
103. Letter from Alberto Guttierez to Jorge Conde, supra note 101, at 1; see also SpectorBagdady & Pike, supra note 62, at 732–35 (describing FDA regulation of direct-to-consumer
services offering software-based interpretation of genetic sequence information).
104. See, e.g., Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs, 37 Fed. Reg.
16,503 (proposed Aug. 15, 1972) (“Congress did not intend the Food and Drug Administration to interfere with medical practice and . . . the bill did not purport to regulate the practice
of medicine as between the physician and the patient.”); Patricia J. Zettler, Toward Coherent
Federal Oversight of Medicine, 52 San Diego L. Rev. 427, 430–32 (2015) (noting “the conventional wisdom among courts, lawmakers, and administrative agencies is that states regulate
medical practice, while the federal government regulates medical products,” though later arguing that the federal government does substantially regulate the practice of medicine and an
arguing for an increased federal role in such regulation); Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical
Federalism, 92 Ind. L.J. 845 (2017) (noting the blurred distinction between practice and products in the contexts of regenerative medicine and genetic testing).
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medicine, FDA regulation of those algorithms might run afoul of this distinction.105 At least for the time being, however, FDA clearly believes it has
the authority to regulate standalone software products, and recent legislation
supports this view. Overall, FDA is likely to be able to exercise considerable
regulatory control over complex medical algorithms.
C. FDA’s Historical Approach
FDA regulation of medical devices is often difficult to divide into neat
categories. This is especially true for regulation of medical algorithms, which
may stand fully alone or be incorporated into many different types of devices. This Section discusses FDA’s historical regulation in two parts. Section
III.C.1 looks at FDA’s general take on software and embedded algorithms,
including both how the agency has thought about the topic and how FDA
has implemented broader policy choices in practice.
“Software” and “algorithm” are flexible terms; here, I use software to
mean the programmatic instructions that run on a computer or other device, and algorithm to mean the underlying method that some software uses
to address a medical problem or suggest a medical decision. A software program that simply records patient records, for instance, would not include
any algorithm as I use the term here.
Section III.C.2 considers a specific set of algorithm-related technology:
diagnostic tests. Diagnostic tests are addressed separately both because a
large portion of modern medical algorithms are related to diagnostics and
because the agency’s approach in this area illuminates the approach it may
take in other, related technological implementations of algorithms.106

105. The question is complicated by the incomprehensibility of black-box algorithms to
providers. A full analysis of this question is outside the scope of this Article. An additional
possible complication, also outside the scope of this Article, is whether standalone medical
algorithms might be considered commercial speech protected by the First Amendment. See,
e.g., Barbara J. Evans, The First Amendment Right to Speak About the Human Genome, 16 U. Pa.
J. Const. L. 549, 590–630 (2014) (arguing that purely informational interpretations of genomic results are speech protected by the First Amendment); Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note
62, at 735–42; Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1495 (2013) (considering when the
output of computer algorithm can be afforded First Amendment protection). First Amendment arguments have sharply limited FDA’s ability to regulate promotion of off-label drug
uses. See Christopher Robertson, When Truth Cannot Be Presumed: The Regulation of Drug
Promotion Under an Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 545, 550–55 (2014).
106. To some extent there is an artificial distinction between software/algorithms and the
diagnostic tests that may use those algorithms. I maintain the distinction here because, to
some extent, it reflects agency action and policy on these issues.
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1. Algorithms and Software
FDA has a long history of regulating medical software.107 Computerized
devices and software have been on the agency’s radar since the 1970s, including a 1981 Task Force on Computers and Software as Medical Devices.108
Early deaths from an algorithmically driven radiation therapy machine, the
Therac-25,109 prompted additional FDA attention in the mid-1980s.110 But
while FDA has considered software for close to four decades, its oversight
has been relatively ad hoc. FDA has passed few regulations specifically directed to software or algorithms.111 Instead, the agency has issued dozens of
nonbinding guidance documents112 and, more consistently, has regulated
through case-by-case adjudication of individual instances.113 But the lack of
regulations and formal policy has meant that many implementations of
medical algorithms pass outside the ambit of this form of oversight. When
algorithms directed at medicine, such as web-based diagnostics or personal
health apps, are implemented and opened to the public without someone
seeking FDA approval or being otherwise actively noticed by FDA, the
agency can provide little to no oversight.114
For those devices that do go through FDA’s approval, most fall into
Class I or Class II, and thus few go through full Class III PMA review.115
107. For a brief but thorough history of FDA regulation of medical software, see Cortez,
supra note 85.
108. Id. at 444.
109. The Therac-25 relied on software to the extent that it removed hardware failsafes,
creating doses so high as to “sometimes burn[ ] literal holes in patients’ bodies.” Cortez, The
Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at 1218–19 (citing Nancy G. Leveson, Medical Devices: The Therac-25, in Safeware: System Safety and Computers app. A (1995)).
110. Id. at 1219–21.
111. See Cortez, supra note 85, at 445 (noting that the only FDA regulations specifically
mentioning software are in device classifications (21 C.F.R. pts. 862–892), rules for radiology
products (21 C.F.R. pts. 1000–1050), and the Quality Systems Regulation requirements that
software’s specifications be documented and that it be subject to validation and manufacturing
controls (21 C.F.R. pt. 820)).
112. See id. at 446–47 (describing the author’s review of fifteen original and eleven updated guidance documents on varied software regulatory topics and “perhaps dozens more”
specifying “special controls” for Class II devices, and noting that guidance often incorporates
guidance from standard-setting bodies).
113. See id. at 445–46.
114. To a certain extent, this is tautologically true of all FDA-regulated technologies; physical medical devices and drugs also must be brought to FDA’s attention or noticed by the
agency to be regulated. These more traditional forms of medical technology, however, typically
follow more well-trodden paths and are thus subject more typically to FDA oversight. Perhaps
more importantly, FDA has issued volumes of regulations clarifying what drugs and medical
devices are, and when they are properly subject to regulation—information that is relatively
absent in the field of medical software and algorithms.
115. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Performance Report to Congress for the Medical
Device User Fee Amendments 11 (2016), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UserFeeReports/PerformanceReports/UCM537819.pdf [https://
perma.cc/43DT-VDV2].
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Devices based on medical algorithms, including those at the heart of
software-based diagnostics, have typically been approved through the 510(k)
pathway, and FDA has often determined that software applications are
equivalent to nonsoftware precedents, even though they perform tasks in a
markedly different manner.116
2. Diagnostic Tests
FDA has been more heavily involved in the regulation of diagnostic
tests. FDA exercises regulatory authority over diagnostic tests as medical devices. But beginning in 1976 with the enactment of the Medical Device
Amendments,117 FDA divided these tests sharply into two different categories: diagnostic kits and laboratory-developed tests. The first were regulated
under FDA’s full medical-device regime. FDA exercised its discretion not to
enforce regulatory requirements for the second category, allowing a proliferation of different tests until quite recently.
Diagnostic kits. FDA regulates in vitro diagnostics (IVDs) under the device approval classification and pathway described above.118 FDA defines
IVDs as products that are intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or
other conditions and involve the collection, preparation, and examination of
specimens taken from the human body.119 Since this definition potentially
covers a broad range of products, FDA can approve or clear IVDs as Class I,
II, or III devices.120
Hospitals and providers use in vitro diagnostics in procedures ranging
from cancer screens to drug tests. Companion diagnostics, such as assays for
the HER2/neu test that identifies which breast cancers are likely to be responsive to the drug Herceptin, may likewise be considered IVD products.121
IVDs also include kits marketed directly to consumers, including home
pregnancy tests, blood-sugar testing kits, and many others. Most IVDs are
classified in Class I or II as low to moderate risk, and therefore most go
through the 510(k) framework.122
116. See Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at 1219.
117. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
118. See supra Section III.A.
119. 21 C.F.R. § 809.3 (2016).
120. Overview of IVD Regulation, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Mar. 19, 2015), http://
www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/IVDRegulatoryAssistance/
ucm123682.htm [http://perma.cc/5S4R-MP58]; see 21 C.F.R. pts. 862–866 (2016).
121. See List of Cleared or Approved Companion Diagnostic Devices (In Vitro and Imaging
Tools), U.S. Food & Drug Admin., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/ucm301431.htm [https://perma.cc/5EHP-TPK7]; supra note
53.
122. Jeffrey Gibbs, Regulatory Pathway for Clearance or Approval of IVDs, in In Vitro
Diagnostics: The Complete Regulatory Guide 43, 44 (Scott D. Danzis & Ellen J. Flannery
eds., 2010).
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Laboratory-developed tests. By contrast, as soon as FDA acquired the authority to regulate medical devices, it chose not to enforce its requirements
for laboratory-developed tests, announcing a policy of “enforcement discretion.”123 It defined laboratory-developed tests as IVDs that are “designed,
manufactured, and used within a single laboratory.”124 FDA’s rationale for
exercising enforcement discretion was that laboratory-developed tests were
relatively simple and used clinical reagents that were themselves FDA approved. Other diagnostic kits are manufactured and sold as products to
providers or directly to patients. Laboratory-developed tests (LDTs), on the
contrary, are marketed as services provided to the health-care provider,
which appears more like the traditionally FDA-unregulated practice of
medicine.125 This Section describes regulation of LDTs in some detail for two
reasons: first, because FDA’s historical approach demonstrates the parameters of their hands-off enforcement discretion, and second, because if blackbox algorithms do fit within the definition of medical devices, most are
likely LDTs because they will be developed and deployed within a single
laboratory.
As described above, getting products approved by FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health can be easy and quick, or it can be an expensive, difficult, and time-consuming process. But it is substantially easier to
just avoid FDA approval process entirely.126 Unsurprisingly, then, the ability
of firms to avoid FDA regulatory requirements by using LDTs rather than
selling diagnostic kits has been highly attractive. The vast majority of diagnostic tests developed in the last four decades have been LDTs.127 In the
process, firms have pushed the limits of what counts as an LDT, while staying with FDA’s definition of a device “designed, manufactured, and used
within a single laboratory.”128
The category of LDTs has thus expanded dramatically. Rather than only
being simple tests actually localized to a single facility, LDTs have grown in
both complexity and scope. Hewing to the letter of FDA’s qualifications for
123. FDA, LDT Draft Guidance, supra note 3, at 5.
124. Id. at 4.
125. See Ronald L. Weiss, The Long and Winding Regulatory Road for Laboratory-Developed
Tests, 138 Am. J. Clinical Pathology 20, 22–24 (2012) (discussing the perception among
those offering LDTs that they are providing medical services rather than operating a medical
device); Juliana Han, Note, The Optimal Scope of FDA Regulation of Genetic Tests: Meeting
Challenges and Keeping Promises, 20 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 423, 427 (2007); supra note 104 and
accompanying text (discussing the understanding that FDA does not regulate the practice of
medicine). One could also argue that when a single laboratory performs a test, no device is
being introduced into commerce. Peter M. Kazon, Regulatory Issues Facing Genetic Testing, J.
Health & Life Sci. L., Jan. 2010, 111, 117; see 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2012) (prohibiting the
introduction of adulterated or misbranded devices into interstate commerce).
126. In addition to avoiding the approval process, staying outside FDA’s regulatory ambit
allows firms to avoid even the general controls and notice requirements applied to all devices,
whether Class I, II, or III. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1) (2012).
127. Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of Personalized
Medicine, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1881 (2016).
128. FDA, LDT Draft Guidance, supra note 3, at 4–7.
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enforcement discretion, complex LDTs are designed, manufactured, and actually performed in a single centralized facility—but that facility exists not
as a part of the hospital or medical school ordering the test, but rather as a
standalone commercial entity.
The best example of this phenomenon, including how it can be used for
technology centered on algorithms, may be Myriad Genetics. For many
years, Myriad was the sole United States source of genetic testing for the
BRCA1/BRCA2 genes, which predict breast- and ovarian-cancer predisposition.129 Then and now, Myriad performs “BRACAnalysis” testing for hospitals and providers’ offices across the country. To help patients and providers
decide on genetic testing, Myriad offers a simple algorithm to predict the
likelihood of BRCA1/BRCA2 mutations based on family-history factors.130
Providers would send a patient’s blood- or cheek-cell sample to Myriad’s
laboratory in Utah; Myriad would perform its genetic analysis, looking for
markers using its proprietary predictive algorithms to compare those markers to its extensive database of mutations and disease predictors;131 and then
Myriad would return results to the providers to be shared with their patients.132 Overall, BRACAnalysis was a multimillion-dollar annual business
for Myriad, using complex laboratory techniques and sophisticated algorithms to test thousands of people nationwide per year.133 Nonetheless, because of the centralization of Myriad’s laboratory, BRACAnalysis has been
considered an LDT and therefore exempted from FDA regulatory scrutiny.134
129. Myriad was the only source of such testing because it held patents on the genes
themselves and on using those genes to perform genetic predisposition testing. Those patents
have since been struck down as covering unpatentable subject matter. Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013) (holding genomic DNA unpatentable); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303,
1335 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding Myriad’s method of genetic testing for breast cancer predisposition unpatentable), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107.
130. BRCA Risk Calculator, Myriad, http://www.myriadpro.com/brca-risk-calculator/
calc.html [https://perma.cc/KGF6-H4HK] (using data from Thomas S. Frank et al., Clinical
Characteristics of Individuals with Germline Mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2: Analysis of 10,000
Individuals, 20 J. Clinical Oncology 1480 (2002)).
131. By virtue of being the sole test provider, Myriad also developed a far more extensive
database of mutations than any other, an advantage it has kept after its patents were struck
down. See Dan L. Burk, Patents as Data Aggregators in Personalized Medicine, 21 B.U. J. Sci. &
Tech. L. 233, 239–40 (2015) (discussing the role of patents in allowing Myriad to assemble its
dataset); cf. Barbara J. Evans, Economic Regulation of Next-Generation Sequencing, 42 J.L. Med.
& Ethics 51 (2014) (discussing data aggregation and siloing).
132. BRACAnalysis® Overview, MyriadPro, https://new.myriadpro.com/products/bracanalysis-overview/#1479841758876-99a68d39-15f7 [https://perma.cc/6KMJ-V3CE] (explaining that results are sent to patient’s health-care provider).
133. J.J. Colao, How a Breast Cancer Pioneer Finally Turned a Profit, Forbes (Oct. 17,
2012, 11:50 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2012/10/17/how-a-breast-cancer-pio
neer-finally-turned-a-profit/#6b54bc1d254b [https://perma.cc/AJ4Y-SVUY].
134. Myriad has also developed a companion diagnostic that uses genetic analysis of
BRCA1/BRCA2 to determine whether patients are eligible for treatment with Lynparza, an
ovarian cancer treatment. Like Myriad’s flagship BRACAnalysis predisposition product, this
product, BRACAnalysis CDx, is an LDT that can only be performed at Myriad’s laboratory in
Salt Lake City. Note, Diagnostic Methods Patents and Harms to Follow-On Innovation, 126
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FDA’s exercise of regulatory discretion for LDTs matters for algorithmic
medicine in two significant ways. First, to the extent that some algorithmic
medicine is indeed centralized because the analyses are only performed at
some central facility, such algorithms would have fit into the enforcement
discretion exception neatly—at least, until FDA recently began discussing
ending its policy of enforcement discretion for LDTs, as described below.135
Second, FDA’s exercise of enforcement discretion over LDTs provides an example of how FDA can pragmatically exempt a large class of medical devices
from preapproval requirements, and demonstrates the rapid innovation—
but also the quality problems—that can result from such a policy.
D. Current Approaches
FDA’s historical approach to regulating medical algorithms and diagnostic tests has changed recently in response to two technological developments. On the pure algorithm side, the past several years have seen an
explosion of mobile-health apps and technologies.136 On the diagnostic-test
side, the field of laboratory-developed tests has grown as just described from
relatively simple on-site tests to highly complex tests that frequently rely on
shipping samples and returning data from far-flung sites to one centralized
laboratory, and often involve complex informatics and algorithms. These
separate developments have prompted distinctly different reactions from
FDA. On mobile health, it has settled on an approach that exempts most
players in the chain of products comprising mobile-health devices. On laboratory-developed tests, FDA is moving forward with a framework to bring
those tests within its preexisting regulatory preapproval regime. This Section
describes these two developments and addresses what they may mean for
algorithms more generally.
1. Algorithms and Mobile Health
Mobile health is currently the subject of a flurry of potential government oversight. Congress137 and several federal agencies, including FDA and
others,138 have considered regulating mobile-health technologies.139 Although the popular press has focused on the disconnect in attitude between
Harv. L. Rev. 1370, 1380 (2013); BRACAnalysis CDx, Myriad Genetics, https://www.myri
ad.com/products-services/companion-diagnostics/bracanalysis-cdx/ [http://perma.cc/HJ632DJY].
135. See infra Section III.D.2.
136. See Cortez, FDA Regulation of Mobile Health, supra note 27, at 372; Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at 1177–78.
137. Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at 1208–09, 1216–17 (describing congressional hearings and general legislative inaction on mHealth).
138. Id. at 1211–16 (describing non-FDA action on regulating mHealth).
139. Id. at 1179, 1208–09. Other interested agencies include the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Department of Defense, the Department
of Commerce, and multiple Department of Health and Human Services subagencies. Id. at
1179.
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mobile-health entrepreneurs and agencies that may regulate them,140 others
have noted that regulating agencies are actually relatively friendly to mobilehealth technologies.141
FDA issued draft guidance in 2011,142 a final guidance document in September 2013,143 and—after some pushback144—a new final guidance document in February 2015 addressing mHealth applications.145 It specified that
it would not exercise jurisdiction over those creating devices or networks on
which mHealth apps would run, but only those developing the apps themselves.146 The agency also stated that it would exercise jurisdiction only over
“mobile medical app[s],” defined as those intended to cure, mitigate, diagnose, prevent, or treat diseases or other conditions, or to affect the body’s
structure or function147—a category that includes many mHealth apps but
140. See, e.g., Associated Press, Silicon Valley Struggles to Speak FDA’s Language, Daily
Mail (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-2752144/Silicon-Valleystruggles-speak-FDAs-language.html [https://perma.cc/2YU6-N3C6]. A poster child for the
clash between Silicon Valley culture and FDA’s regulatory oversight role is the company
23andMe, which developed and sold a consumer-oriented genetic testing kit. After a longrunning dispute between the FDA and 23andMe, FDA sent 23andMe a Warning Letter,
prompting it to cease offering genetic testing results. See Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Dir.,
Office of In Vitro Diagnostics & Radiological Health, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health,
Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., to Ann Wojicki, Chief Exec. Officer, 23andMe, Inc. (Nov.
22, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2013/
ucm376296.htm [https://perma.cc/A2G2-XJS5]; John Timmer, 23andMe Bows to FDA, Drops
All Medical Information from New Tests, Ars Technica (Dec. 6, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/science/2013/12/23andme-bows-to-fda-drops-all-medical-information-fromnew-tests/ [https://perma.cc/XFR5-45RX]. In a postscript illustrating difficulties in regulating
new health technologies, 23andMe now offers customers their raw sequence data and directs
them to a crowdsourced website where they can interpret their own results—presumably not
FDA’s ideal result. After 23andMe went through FDA regulatory process, FDA approved its
testing services for Bloom Syndrome in 2015. Cyrus Farivar, FDA Allows 23AndMe to Use Its
Genetic Kits to Test for Bloom Syndrome, Ars Technica (Feb. 20, 2015, 2:09 PM), http://
arstechnica.com/science/2015/02/fda-allows-23andme-to-use-its-genetic-kits-to-test-forbloom-syndrome/ [https://perma.cc/5EXF-5N84].
141. See Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at 1179, 1206 (describing
agency responses as generally “optimistic and aspirational,” but also describing the app industry as “relatively naı̈ve to any kind of regulation”).
142. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug
Administration Staff: Mobile Medical Applications (2011), ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/
CLIAC_meeting_presentations/pdf/Addenda/cliac0811/T_addendum_
FDA_Draft_Guidance_for_Mobile_Medical_Devices.pdf [https://perma.cc/P86D-67AC].
143. Mobile Medical Applications: Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,038 (Sept. 25, 2013).
144. E.g., Emily Wasserman, Lawmakers Question FDA Oversight of Mobile Medical Apps as
Market Booms, FierceBiotech (June 17, 2014, 3:58 PM), http://www.fiercebiotech.com/medi
cal-devices/lawmakers-question-fda-oversight-mobile-medical-apps-as-market-booms [https:/
/perma.cc/39L9-544D].
145. FDA, Mobile Medical App Guidance, supra note 100.
146. Id. at 9–11.
147. Id. at 7–8.
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has tremendously unclear boundaries.148 Apps that would otherwise not fit
with FDA’s definition—apps designed to provide reference materials, to
track general well-being or health, or to perform office functions, for instance—fall under FDA jurisdiction if they “use patient-specific data to generate customized diagnoses or treatment recommendations.”149 Both FDA
and industry recognize that FDA’s traditional relatively rigid regulatory approaches may interact poorly with the fluid and fast-moving structure of the
mobile-health industry.150 Nevertheless, as the guidance currently stands, a
large swath of mHealth apps appear subject to FDA’s jurisdiction as medical
devices subject to the requirements described above.151
2. Laboratory-Developed Tests
In the field of laboratory-developed tests, FDA has also moved to bring
more technologies, including many centered on algorithmic medicine,
within its stricter regulatory ambit. In July 2014, FDA announced that it
intended to change its approach to regulating laboratory-developed tests
substantially.152 In its notice of proposed rulemaking, FDA stated that it intended to adopt a risk-based framework to laboratory-developed tests.153
FDA specifically described potential risk factors in modern LDTs, including that many are “used to direct critical treatment decisions (e.g., prediction of drug response)[, or are] highly complex (e.g., automated
interpretation, multi-signal devices, use of non-transparent algorithms and/
or complex software to generate device results).”154 These characteristics are
central to the concept of complex medical algorithms in general and blackbox medicine in particular, and thus significantly increased FDA regulation
of algorithmic medicine appears likely under this approach.
Under the risk-based classification regime, as described above,155 lowrisk devices (Class I) are subject to registration, listing, and adverse-eventreporting requirements. Moderate-risk devices (Class II) are subject to the
same requirements and additional specific controls; they must also either
demonstrate equivalence to an already-approved device (through the 510(k)
148. Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at 1203–06 (describing the
unclear boundaries between categories of definitely, definitely-not, and maybe regulated device
under FDA guidance).
149. FDA, Mobile App Guidance, supra note 100, at 15–25; Cortez, The Mobile Health
Revolution?, supra note 27, at 1204. Notably, these general categories of software are excluded
from the definition of medical devices under the 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255,
§ 3060, 130 Stat. 1033, 1130 (2016) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)–(2)).
150. Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at 1206–08.
151. Even for apps that FDA has said are only potentially regulable, the agency has encouraged developers to abide by its quality requirements. FDA, Mobile Medical App Guidance, supra note 100, at 13.
152. FDA, LDT Draft Guidance, supra note 3.
153. Id. at 1.
154. Id. at 8.
155. See supra Section III.A.
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pathway) or undergo a more rigorous de novo approval. High-risk devices
(Class III) must undergo a full PMA process. LDTs that address rare diseases
or unmet needs, or which resemble traditional LDTs, will need only to register, be listed, and report adverse events.156
The eventual classification of complex medical algorithms will await
FDA action.157 But complex algorithms and black-box-medicine implementations are quite likely to be considered higher-risk devices. In general, devices with new intended uses are classified as Class III as a matter of law,158
though FDA may down classify those devices if appropriate, including if they
serve an unmet need.159 More specifically, FDA has identified as a generally
higher-risk class those devices “that act like companion diagnostics,”
including
those devices that claim to enhance the use of a specific therapeutic product, though selection of therapy, patient population, or dose, but which are
not included in the therapeutic product labeling (e.g., devices that claim to
predict who will respond to a therapy approved for use in a larger
population).160

This group is a precise definition of most of black-box medicine and much
of the scope of complex medical algorithms in general; implementations will
thus be most likely classified as higher-risk devices, either Class II or Class
III, and subject in turn to much higher regulatory barriers to approval.
Overall, FDA’s intent to more tightly regulate LDTs has been estimated to
increase regulatory costs by one to two orders of magnitude,161 and it remains an open empirical question whether such increased regulatory costs
would be worth incurring.162
In late 2016, FDA announced that it had decided to postpone finalizing
the draft guidance after substantial pushback from industry.163 Final action
156. FDA, LDT Draft Guidance, supra note 3, at 11, 19–22. FDA stated that it intended
to issue classification guidance within 24 months after finalization of the LDT guidance, id. at
24, which has been postponed, see infra notes 163–164 and accompanying text.
157. In determining the risk classification of an LDT, FDA will consider, among other
factors, the risk level of the disease/patient population, use in screening versus diagnosis, what
clinical decision will be based on the test, the availability of other information in making that
decision, alternatives for diagnosis and treatment, the cost of error, and the existence of adverse events. FDA, LDT Draft Guidance, supra note 3, at 10–11.
158. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 513(f)(1), 21 U.S.C. 360c(f)(1) (2012).
159. FDA, LDT Draft Guidance, supra note 3, at 25.
160. Id. at 25–26. Opacity and risk are not necessarily linked; one could imagine a very
low-risk opaque algorithm (for instance, predicting male-pattern baldness based on a large
number of genetic factors).
161. Sachs, supra note 127, at 1895.
162. See infra notes 189–194 and accompanying text (describing LDT quality failures).
163. See Sheila Kaplan, FDA Puts off Closing Lab-Test ‘Loophole,’ Leaving Decision to Congress and Trump, Stat (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/11/18/fda-lab-testloophole/ [https://perma.cc/E4N8-WHYN].
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will await input from Congress and from the new administration.164 In January 2017, FDA did approve one machine-learning-based application for
clinical use under the 510(k) clearance pathway, but the application does not
diagnose disease or recommend treatment—it uses image analysis to calculate the volume of heart ventricles.165 FDA did also distribute a discussion
paper describing its current thinking with respect to LDTs in the same
month.166 Although the discussion paper notes potential slowdowns in implementation of full LDT oversight and suggests the possibility of
grandfathering existing LDTs, it does not suggest that the agency’s thinking
has changed with respect to opaque algorithms that make diagnoses or predictions to direct clinical care.167
IV. Challenges in Existing Approaches
FDA’s existing piecemeal approach raises substantial challenges in dealing with the increasing pace of development and variety of medical algorithms. These challenges come from two directions, reflecting both common
debates about regulation and deregulation and the two recent approaches
FDA has taken. On the one hand is the problem of overregulation, exemplified by the adoption of FDA’s full risk-based framework for LDTs, including
its likely classification of black-box algorithms as Class III devices demanding full premarket approval. On the other is a worry about underregulation,
as in FDA’s decision to leave some fraction of mHealth applications largely
unregulated (mirroring its earlier treatment of LDTs).
A.

Overregulation

FDA has indicated in its approach to LDTs that it may take a stricter
regulatory approach, which I argue here could be overregulatory. Under this
approach, algorithmic medicine would be treated roughly according to the
risk-based framework applied to all medical devices; more complex algorithms would be more likely to receive more substantial regulatory scrutiny,
including—in many cases—full premarket approval requirements as Class
164. Id. For a description of potential benefits of agency decisions to postpone difficult
enforcement decisions, see Sharon B. Jacobs, The Administrative State’s Passive Virtues, 66 Admin. L. Rev. 565, 575–83 (2014).
165. Bernard Marr, First FDA Approval for Clinical Cloud-Based Deep Learning in Healthcare, Forbes: Tech (Jan. 20, 2017, 2:11 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/
01/20/first-fda-approval-for-clinical-cloud-based-deep-learning-in-healthcare/#407883d5161c
[https://perma.cc/Q3D9-884P].
166. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Discussion Paper on Laboratory Developed Tests
(LDTs) (2017) [hereinafter FDA, Discussion Paper on LDTs], http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/LaboratoryDe
velopedTests/UCM536965.pdf [https://perma.cc/NF8U-Z3PP].
167. Note also that such algorithms are not excluded from the definition of medical devices under the 21st Century Cures Act, passed roughly a month after FDA’s decision to defer
finalizing the draft guidance. Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3060 (2016) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 260j(o)(1)(E)).
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III devices. This approach faces two main challenges. The first arises from
practical limits on FDA’s ability to regulate algorithms. The second arises
from concerns that excessive FDA regulation may stifle innovation in developing new medical algorithms, especially when such algorithms may constantly evolve.
1. Limits on FDA’s Regulatory Ability
FDA’s attempts to regulate are likely to face substantial practical difficulties. From a political economy perspective, FDA’s moves to more tightly
regulate mHealth applications, in particular, have met with substantial
pushback from entrepreneurs, commentators, and Congress, and corresponding walk backs of proposed policy changes.168 Similarly, intense opposition to FDA’s proposal to more strictly regulate LDTs led the agency to
postpone final action, though without repudiating its view that opaque diagnostic algorithms should be considered high-risk Class III devices.169 In addition, stricter premarket regulation demands expertise in algorithm
development, validation, and operation—expertise that FDA largely lacks.170
Especially for more complicated and black-box algorithms, implementing
strict regulatory control efficiently and correctly is likely to be a substantial
challenge for the agency. Nevertheless, it is not obvious that any other government agency would do a better job—nor that any other agency has the
statutory mandate to do so.171 Finally, there remain some doubts about the
limits of FDA’s statutory authority to regulate all black-box algorithms,
though as described above, these are likely of only mild concern.172
2. Limits on Innovation
The second major challenge to command-and-control premarket regulation of algorithmic medicine comes in the cost to innovation. FDA’s current approach is likely to create substantial difficulties enabling innovation
in the field of algorithmic medicine. If the status quo were ideal, this might
168. See supra Section III.D.1 (noting FDA’s change of position on regulating mobile
health technologies). For more on the political economy of FDA regulations, see Daniel Carpenter, Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA 33–70 (2010).
169. FDA, Discussion Paper on LDTs, supra note 166.
170. See Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at 1206 (describing FDA’s
awareness that “it lacks technical expertise on mobile technologies”); supra note 27 and accompanying text.
171. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services regulate clinical laboratories analyzing specimens under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments, for instance, but this
covers only quality controls at facilities “for the biological, microbiological, serological, chemical, immuno-hematological, hematological, biophysical, cytological, pathological, or other examination of materials derived from the human body for the purpose of providing
information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or
the assessment of the health of, human beings.” 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (2012).
172. See supra Section III.B.
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be fine—but the medical system is rife with uncertainty and errors, and
black-box algorithms have the promise to bring major improvements to
health and life.173
As described above, many more complex types of medical algorithms—
especially black-box algorithms—are very likely to be classified as Class III
devices requiring a full premarket approval process.174 But this process is the
most involved, most expensive, and most time-consuming form of regulation in FDA’s arsenal of regulatory oversight. This has two impacts on this
type of algorithmic medicine. First, it significantly increases the hurdles of
getting particular algorithms developed and to the market. Second, it substantially limits the flexibility of algorithms to change with additional data.
The first concern is one familiar to many areas of regulation—when
hurdles to bringing a product to market are increased, overall market incentives for firms to develop that product are decreased.175 This pattern is typical for regulated industries but should nonetheless be noted. In other FDAregulated contexts, intellectual-property protection, especially patents, may
provide counterbalancing incentives to develop new technology. But intellectual-property incentives for algorithmic medicine are substantially weaker
than those available for other FDA-regulated technologies.176 The weight of
FDA regulations on innovation is significant, as evidenced by the much
more rapid development of laboratory-developed tests than diagnostic kits,
despite the potentially broader market for the latter.177 And to the extent that
black-box algorithms may be developed cheaply, imposing higher regulatory
burdens could negate that advantage.
The second concern is more distinct to algorithmic medicine. Ideally,
medical algorithms—especially those disassociated from particular physical
products—should be able to be flexibly updated as more data are collected.
Some monitoring systems operate in real time or near-real time, taking into
account how individual patients are doing across a medical system, such as a
large hospital, and making recommendations about treatment choices accordingly.178 One version of such a system would envision a static algorithm—given data X, Y, and Z about how patients are doing, and a
shortage of hospital beds, preferentially discharge patients A and B over patient C; over months and years, that conditionality remains constant. More
173. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 179–191 and accompanying text.
175. This barrier to market entry has different effects on different market actors. Incumbent firms may be protected from new market entrants by substantial barriers to entry. See
Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 356–57 (describing incumbent-protecting barriers to market entry
created by hurdles to FDA approval).
176. An in-depth consideration of the lack of strong intellectual property incentives for
medical algorithms, especially for black-box algorithms, is outside the scope of this Article but
is discussed in detail in Price, supra note 15.
177. See supra Section III.C.2.
178. See Cohen et al., supra note 56 (describing the use of predictive analytics to prioritize
allocation of scarce hospital resources).
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sophisticated versions, however, can be adapted over time: perhaps condition Y was an artifact of the original patient population and is actually irrelevant or actively unhelpful—the recommendation algorithm should then be
modified to remove Y. If that algorithm were approved under the standard
FDA device preapproval pathway, such a modification might require clinical
trials, extensive regulatory filings, and potentially an entirely new preapproval process. This would substantially slow the development of adaptive
algorithms that take account of new data.
In the broader context of medicine, one near-term goal is for a “learning health system.”179 In such a system, treatment and research are increasingly integrated rather than being strictly segregated.180 As medicine is
practiced, providers collect evidence about what treatments work, when,
and how; that evidence can then be used to continuously update how providers practice medicine going forward.181 Medical algorithms offer that capacity in a technological context; indeed, one way to actually develop a
responsive learning health-care system is through the deployment of such
algorithms, and vice versa.182 If FDA uses the regulatory hook that these
algorithms are medical devices, either themselves or when implemented on
computers used in health care, the preapproval process stands to substantially limit the type of ongoing flexible innovation that algorithms enable for
a learning health-care system.
The contours of market access and command-and-control regulation
implicate a familiar debate about the speed with which FDA approves new
technologies. Delay helps ensure safety, but it also limits care advances and
patient access in the meantime.183 The question here is whether, given the
cost and speed advantages of black-box-algorithm development, the balance
is better struck on the side of earlier access.

179. See, e.g., Harlan M. Krumholz, Big Data and New Knowledge in Medicine: The Thinking, Training, and Tools Needed for a Learning Health System, 33 Health Aff. 1163 (2014).
180. Id. at 1164.
181. Id. at 1167.
182. Id. at 1168.
183. This debate is long-standing. See Stephen Barlas, Critics Assail FDA Medical Device
Approval Process, 36 J. Clinical Pharmacy & Therapeutics 395 (2011) (noting delays in the
device approval process); Daniel P. Carpenter, Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, and
FDA Drug Approval, 46 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 490 (2002) (providing an account of varying agency
delays); Jonathan J. Darrow et al., New FDA Breakthrough-Drug Category—Implications for
Patients, 370 New Eng. J. Med. 1252 (2014) (noting implications of FDA’s faster approval
pathway); Cassie Frank et al., Era of Faster FDA Drug Approval Has Also Seen Increased BlackBox Warnings and Market Withdrawals, 33 Health Aff. 1453 (2014) (noting safety costs of
faster drug approval); J.D. Kleinke & Scott Gottlieb, Is the FDA Approving Drugs Too Fast?, 317
Brit. Med. J. 899 (1998) (noting debate about FDA speed versus safety); Samantha A. Roberts
et al., Despite Criticism of FDA Review Process, New Cancer Drugs Reach Patients Sooner in the
United States than in Europe, 30 Health Aff. 1375 (2011) (noting that FDA is faster than
other parallel regulators).
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B. Underregulation
Coming from the other direction, there are also substantial problems
with the possibility of FDA underregulation of algorithmic medicine. Part II
described the need for regulation of algorithmic medicine; it has great potential to help but also to harm, and is difficult for nonregulators to evaluate, suggesting some role for regulation.
Nathan Cortez has described this problem in detail in the context of
mHealth. Cortez argues that FDA’s relative informality in regulating
software has created substantial problems for the development of mHealth
applications.184 When regulators do not exercise strict oversight, firms have
more room to produce poor-quality products. But the availability of those
poor-quality products—before the market weeds them out—can result in
injuries to customers and decreased consumer trust, slowing the process of
high-quality technology development.185
Because black-box medicine is so new, we do not yet have examples of
specific regulatory failures. But we do have potent examples of what can
happen when diagnostic tests are poorly developed, whether in the mHealth
context or outside it, especially with insufficient regulatory oversight.186 In a
recent study, for instance, two-thirds of insulin-calculation apps had a risk
of outputting incorrect insulin dosages.187 A 2017 review of advances in diabetes mHealth apps noted the “obvious oversupply of mHealth apps,” described the difficulty for doctors and patients of choosing “a ‘good’ app for
diabetes management,” and lamented that most apps did not “meet the
minimum requirements of an effective app” and could harm users.188
Unfortunately, many LDTs marketed under FDA’s enforcement discretion have faced similar quality problems.189 FDA collected several such case
studies in 2015. For example, a test for Lyme disease incorrectly identified a
substantial fraction of uninfected patients as having the disease.190 Two
couples were awarded a total of $30 million in damages for undergoing
184. See Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at 1226–29.
185. Id.; see also Cortez, supra note 85, at 453 (“FDA regulation can even be ‘marketconstituting,’ in that it sustains consumer confidence that would otherwise erode if flooded
with substandard products . . . .” (citing Daniel Carpenter, Confidence Games: How Does Regulation Constitute Markets, in Government and Markets: Toward a New Theory of Regulation 164 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2009))).
186. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., The Public Health Evidence for FDA Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests: 20 Case Studies (2015) [hereinafter FDA, The
Public Health Evidence for FDA Oversight of LDTs], http:/www.fda.gov/downloads/
AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UCM472777.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VRC-B3YK]
(providing examples of failures from unregulated laboratory-developed tests).
187. Kit Huckvale et al., Smartphone Apps for Calculating Insulin Dose: A Systematic Assessment, 13 BMC Med. 106 (2015).
188. Farhad Fatehi et al., Mobile Health (mHealth) for Diabetes Care: Opportunities and
Challenges, 19 Diabetes Tech. & Therapeutics 1 (2017).
189. FDA, The Public Health Evidence for FDA Oversight of LDTs, supra note 186.
190. Id. at 8–9.
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“months of unnecessary treatment” based on such false positives.191 Other
problematic tests included tests for ovarian cancer with high false-positive
rates, leading to the possibility of women needlessly choosing to have their
ovaries removed;192 a next-generation test for HER2/neu that missed some
positive cases, with an estimated $775,278 cost of treatment foregone per
false negative;193 and a test to predict response to cholesterol-lowering statin
drugs that relied on a genetic variation with no relationship to statin response—a lack of response only verified after over 150,000 tests had been
performed on patients.194
The most dramatic recent story of quality problems for diagnostic tests
is undoubtedly that of Theranos. Theranos promised to revolutionize diagnostic testing by taking tiny finger-stick blood samples, rather than large
intravenous draws, and analyzing them for many possible problems.195 Theranos’s methods, including how precisely it performed its chemical reactions
and the algorithms it used to analyze them, were kept completely secret.196
Theranos did not publish quality controls for its tests, and since it used
centralized testing procedures, for a long time it faced no FDA regulation as
an LDT.197 The entire enterprise came down when a journalist revealed
widespread problems with the company’s methods,198 followed by a pair of
devastating reports from FDA and CMS inspectors who found that Theranos’s tests were inaccurate and unreliable.199 Theranos’s CEO, Elizabeth
191. Id. at 9.
192. Id. at 9–12.
193. Id. at 14–15.
194. Id. at 19–20.
195. John Carreyrou, Hot Startup Theranos Has Struggled With Its Blood-Test Technology,
Wall Street J. (Oct. 16, 2015, 3:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-has-strug
gled-with-blood-tests-1444881901 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
196. See John P.A. Ioannidis, Stealth Research: Is Biomedical Innovation Happening Outside
the Peer-Reviewed Literature?, 313 JAMA 663 (2015).
197. Theranos stated that it submitted all of its LDTs to FDA for approval, though it
offered these tests before receiving any approval. See Letter from Elizabeth Holmes, Chief Exec.
Officer, Theranos, to Margaret Hamburg, Comm’r of Food & Drugs, FDA (Mar. 1, 2015) (on
file with author). Eventually, Theranos was granted FDA approval for its herpes simplex test
under the 510(k) pathway in 2015. Letter from Sally A. Hojvat, Dir., Div. of Microbiology
Devices, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Brad Arington, Assoc. Dir., Regulatory, Theranos
(July 2, 2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2157669/
k143236-letter-se-final-corrected-2015-07-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FQE-P2GP].
198. Carreyrou, supra note 195.
199. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Statement of Deficiencies for Theranos, Inc. (2015), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2781859/Theranos-2567-WithRedactions-03-31-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FDH-XDV8]; U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Inspection Report for Theranos, Inc. (2015) [hereinafter FDA, Inspection Report for
Theranos, Inc.], http://www.fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-afda-orgs/documents/document/ucm469395.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5BL-FDGQ]. FDA noted that Theranos’s
“[n]anotainer” for capturing tiny blood samples as a Class II “uncleared medical device”
which was shipped in interstate commerce. FDA, Inspection Report for Theranos, Inc.,
supra, at 1.
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Holmes, has been barred from clinical diagnostic testing for two years.200
Other companies relying on complex diagnostics similarly rely on the laboratory-developed-test exception to avoid oversight,201 and FDA has collected
examples of other problems arising from this practice.202
Underregulation may be especially likely when algorithm developers are
the only ones who have or can provide information about how the algorithms were developed or trained.203 Developers may have incentives to
downplay potential problems in the quest for FDA approval.204 In addition,
whatever biases or mistakes were present in initial algorithm development
may color developers’ ability to verify their own algorithms and to identify
problems.205 Finding problems may depend on the ability of FDA—with its
potential lack of expertise—or third parties to independently evaluate algorithm quality.206
V. Reform
FDA faces substantial challenges in regulating algorithmic medicine, but
it can and should still play an important role in that regulation. As described
above, practical hurdles and potentially dampening effects on innovation
limit the benefits of an approach that relies on strict classification into highrisk pre-approval categories.
So how should FDA regulate algorithmic medicine? To suggest answers,
I turn to the growing literature on new governance, which explores and theorizes new techniques of regulation. Precise definitions of the new governance movement have proven somewhat contentious,207 but broadly speaking,
it addresses some moves “away from the familiar model of command-style,
200. Andrew Pollack, Elizabeth Holmes of Theranos Is Barred from Running Lab for 2 Years,
N.Y. Times (July 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/business/theranos-elizabethholmes-ban.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). Theranos is appealing the decision.
Sarah A. O’Brien, Theranos Fights Back Against Sanctions, CNN: Tech (Aug. 26, 2016, 9:03
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/26/technology/theranos-appealing-cms-sanctions/
[https://perma.cc/C5AB-JFSQ].
201. See Arielle Duhaime-Ross, Theranos Isn’t the Only Diagnostics Company Exploiting
Regulatory Loopholes, Verge (Nov. 11, 2015, 8:28 AM), http://www.theverge.com/science/
2015/11/11/9706356/fda-theranos-health-diagnostics-cancer-tests-regulation-loophole-ldt
[https://perma.cc/XTJ2-KZXG] (describing three companies performing complex cancer genetics tests designed to direct cancer treatment).
202. FDA, The Public Health Evidence for FDA Oversight of LDTs, supra note 186.
203. See Ford & Price, supra note 68, at 12.
204. See id. at 15 n.52.
205. Id. at 14–15.
206. Id. at 19.
207. Compare Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342, 346–47 (2004) (noting that New
Governance brings together into one field insights from scholarship on “ ‘reflexive law,’ ‘soft
law,’ ‘collaborative governance,’ ‘democratic experimentalism,’ ‘responsive regulation,’ ‘outsourcing regulation,’ ‘reconstitutive law,’ ‘post-regulatory law,’ ‘revitalizing regulation,’ ‘regulatory pluralism,’ ‘decentering regulation,’ ‘meta-regulation,’ ‘contractarian law,’
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fixed-rule regulation by administrative fiat, and toward a new model of collaborative, multi-party, multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving New Governance.”208 Orly Lobel provides a (similarly contestable) set of organizing
principles that can also be thought of as tools for new governance: (1) participation and partnership; (2) collaboration; (3) diversity and competition;
(4) decentralization and subsidiarity; (5) integration of policy domains; (6)
flexibility and noncoerciveness (or softness-in-law); (7) fallibility, adaptability, and dynamic learning; and (8) law as competence and orchestration.209
Though new governance offers a useful set of tools that could help improve potential FDA regulation of black-box medicine, I am not arguing the
full set should be adopted uncritically. Indeed, new governance has been
subject to substantial criticism, including concerns about whether it is appropriate for all contexts.210 It has also been described as lacking a mechanism to resolve normative conflicts;211 in this context, new governance likely
cannot tell us where the appropriate balance is between risk and safety, innovation and caution. I do not aim to address these larger concerns with the
new governance project; instead, I seek to borrow a few tools that seem
particularly suited to the context of FDA regulation of black-box medicine.
Broadly speaking, I argue that FDA should still exercise centralized command-and-control regulatory oversight. But a better approach for black-box
medicine would combine more moderate up-front regulation—graded by
risk but with lower barriers than the full premarket approval pathway—with
robust postmarket surveillance to monitor the performance of algorithms in
real-world settings. Crucially, this latter role should not fall to FDA alone.
Instead, other players in the health care ecosystem should collaboratively
help to monitor algorithmic safety and efficacy. For providers, hospital systems, and insurers to play a meaningful role in the postmarket oversight of
medical algorithms, they need access to meaningful information about those
algorithms. There, FDA should supplement its command-and-control regulation by facilitating the sharing of information to those other players to
‘communicative governance,’ ‘negotiated governance,’ ‘destabilization rights,’ ‘cooperative implementation,’ ‘interactive compliance,’ ‘public laboratories,’ ‘deepened democracy and empowered participatory governance,’ ‘pragmatic lawyering,’ ‘nonrival partnership,’ and ‘a
daring legal system’ ” (footnotes omitted)), with Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89
Minn. L. Rev. 471, 479–81 (2004) (criticizing Lobel for largely failing to “acknowledge[ ] any
debate, difference, or diverging tendency among New Governance scholars”).
208. Karkkainen, supra note 207, at 473.
209. Lobel, supra note 207, at 342, 371–404.
210. See, e.g., Grainne de Burca, New Governance and Experimentalism: An Introduction,
2010 Wis. L. Rev. 227, 235–38 (canvassing some concerns about new governance); Martha
Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 Harv. L. Rev.
1229 (2003) (describing concerns with public and private partnerships).
211. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 34–40 (2006) (criticizing a pragmatist-experimentalist approach
in the employment discrimination context); Lobel, supra note 207, at 455 (noting the illusion
that “comprehensive and widespread information on an issue will eventually lead people to
converge normatively on the same positions”).
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enable robust, flexible oversight. This Section describes each of these elements and the extent to which they draw on new governance tools; it does
not address in detail the extent to which these reforms could be implemented under FDA’s current statutory authority.212
A. Command-and-Control Regulation
FDA cannot and should not abandon its command-and-control role in
directly regulating premarket access for at least some forms of algorithmic
medicine. Although command-and-control regulation has been seriously
criticized,213 the challenges of evaluating health-related credence goods suggest at least some role for FDA-directed mandatory regulation.214 Shaping
preapproval requirements to risk level also fits the contours of new medical
technology and comports with FDA’s traditional gatekeeping role.215 Particularly high-risk algorithms—those that directly influence critical treatment
choices, such as whether to perform surgery or to prescribe chemotherapy—
should probably face more stringent preapproval review than less risky algorithms. FDA works in a risk framework; its proposed laboratory-developed
test framework applies a risk-based framework,216 and it is exercising something like a hands-off approach to mobile-health algorithms except those
that are directly involved in directing or replacing other FDA-approved medical devices.217
But in following this framework, FDA is still relying too much on categorical rules rather than a more flexible, adaptive approach. One strain of
new governance offers the idea of such strategies, variously described as “incremental,” or “experimentalist.” The experimentalist subset of new governance scholars, including Charles Sabel and Michael Dorf, emphasizes the
idea of devolving authority to more local levels, measuring the results, and
adopting the most successful.218 Here, I propose that a more modest—and

212. Whether FDA can regulate algorithms standing alone depends on their status as
regulable medical devices, as addressed in Section III.B. The mechanisms by which FDA regulates algorithms similarly depends on current law (which establishes the classes of medical
devices, for instance). FDA does have a great deal of flexibility, but this Article does not address which potential reforms arguably fit within that flexibility and which would require new
statutory authority. Those questions remain for future work.
213. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333, 1335–37 (1985) (critiquing command-and-control regulation as expensive, rigid, and inefficient).
214. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
215. See generally Carpenter, supra note 168, at 1–32 (describing FDA’s role as
gatekeeper).
216. FDA, LDT Draft Guidance, supra note 3, at 3.
217. See FDA, Mobile Medical App Guidance, supra note 100, at 4.
218. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 314–23 (1998); Lobel, supra note 207, at 379–81.
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older—incremental approach may be more appropriate.219 FDA can begin
with a tentative policy on regulating black-box algorithms, then proceed
iteratively, adapting that policy to new information as the technology develops.220 Such a strategy especially suits the rapidly developing technology of
black-box medical algorithms.221
For now, it looks like FDA is moving in the opposite direction, leaning
toward a categorical approach.222 FDA’s proposed rules on laboratory-developed tests classified any tests used for diagnostics or using nontransparent
algorithms as being categorically high-risk and therefore subject to the full
PMA process.223 But opacity can vary independently of risk. Tuning preapproval requirements to opacity—that is, applying more stringent requirements to nontransparent algorithms, whatever their underlying risk—means
that more stringent rules will apply to those algorithms developed as black
boxes precisely because that approach allows more flexible, quicker, cheaper
development.
In the mobile-health context, FDA may err too much on the side of
categorical permissiveness. Mobile-health applications can do substantial
mischief without interfacing directly with medical devices or taking their
place by, for instance, erroneously suggesting that patients avoid taking a
particular medication, cancel a provider’s appointment as unnecessary, or
exercise strenuously in the face of cardiac warning signs.224
Striking this balance may seem a Goldilocksian task, but this is precisely
the point of an incremental, adaptive response that responds to new information as the technology develops.225 But even an incremental approach assumes some initial decision rule: What is the initial approach which will be
modified once new information is received? In the case of black-box
medicine, a baseline that opaque algorithms are Class III devices requiring
219. See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev.
393, 399–409 (1981); Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through”, 19 Pub. Admin. Rev. 79 (1959).
220. Diver, supra note 219, at 399–409. For an account of adaptive regulation, see, for
example, Craig & Ruhl, supra note 6, which discusses how administrative law can take account
of an iterative, adaptive management strategy.
221. See Sharon B. Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, 43 Ecology L.Q. 519, 572 (2017) (noting
that incremental or experimentalist approaches are appropriate for “complex and rapidly developing technology”). But see Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 27, at
1222–23 (arguing that FDA should take a more stringent, brighter-line regulatory tack to
discipline industry and to allow it to grow within a framework of more predictable rules).
222. It is hard to state definitively what approach FDA might or might not adopt, or
might even be adopting already; I base these analyses on the information available through
guidance and agency action.
223. See supra Section III.D.2.
224. See, e.g., Torie Bosch, mHealth Care Crisis: Should the FDA Regulate Smartphone Medical Apps?, Slate (Aug. 2, 2011, 12:29 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future
_tense/2011/08/mhealth_care_crisis.html [https://perma.cc/F32Z-Z7V7].
225. See Lobel, supra note 207, at 388–95 (describing “soft law” concepts that can be
applied alongside “hard law” regulations and rules, including an explicit goal of regulatory
flexibility).
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premarket approval would hamper the development of black-box medicine
quite a bit. Given the promise of black-box medicine, and the realities of
existing flaws in the medical system, a baseline of lighter-touch regulation
seems a better approach.
One possible alternate approach to premarket access could rely on regulating algorithmic medicine by developer, rather than by individual algorithm. This would be similar to CMS’s Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments framework, which requires laboratory certification based on
the complexity of testing performed at facilities.226 Certification requirements (including personnel qualifications and quality control) vary based
on test complexity.227 Adopting a similar system for black-box medicine
might encourage developers to create and test a wide variety of algorithms
under appropriate regulatory surveillance. FDA may be open to such an approach; when the agency approved 23andMe’s first direct-to-consumer genetic test in spring 2017, it approved an initial slate of ten tests and stated
that it “intends to exempt additional 23andMe [genetic-health-risk] tests
from FDA’s premarket review, and [that such] tests from other makers may
be exempt after submitting their first premarket notification.”228 FDA noted
that such an approach “would allow other, similar tests to enter the market
as quickly as possible and in the least burdensome way, after a one-time
FDA review.”229 FDA has expressed some interest in expanding this approach
to some medical software, describing in mid-2017 a possible program where
trusted software developers could face lighter premarket security.230
An incremental or experimentalist approach is not without its risks. The
risks of low-quality algorithms have been discussed above.231 Procedurally,
incrementalism risks the possibility that the status quo becomes entrenched
and adaptation fails to occur.232 To help avoid these risks, both in terms of
patient safety and in terms of procedural stagnation, a lighter touch on
226. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments (CLIA) and Medicare Laboratory Services 2–3 (2015), https://
www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/
Downloads/CLIABrochure-TextOnly.pdf [https://perma.cc/MWH9-R73R].
227. Id.
228. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Allows Marketing of First Direct-toConsumer Tests that Provide Genetic Risk Information for Certain Conditions (April 6, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm55185.htm [https://
perma.cc/SJ7C-N28B].
229. Id.
230. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Digital Health Innovation Action Plan 5–6 (2017),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/UCM568735.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E5ZP-K98J].
231. See supra Section IV.B.
232. See, e.g., Cristie Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons from
Financial Regulation, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 441, 470–71 (“[I]t would be unwise to underestimate
the amount of energy and focus required to push incremental change (or even to identify its
direction, given the background noise) in the direction of prior commitments and empirically
demonstrable improvement.”).
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premarket access—however implemented—should be complemented by
continuing oversight once products are in use.
B. Postmarket Surveillance
Relying solely on premarket regulation is likely insufficient to strike the
right balance between innovation and safety for medical algorithms. A substantial strength of medical algorithms is that they can be developed relatively quickly, and at relatively low cost, and that they can change over
time—this last especially true in the case of machine-learning-based blackbox medicine. Premarket approval limits these strengths, but postmarket
surveillance complements them. When algorithms are based on existing data
and observational studies, observing how those algorithms perform in the
real world is critical to ensuring their safety and efficacy. New governance
offers tools in this context, emphasizing the importance of flexibility and an
iterative approach.233 As Cristie Ford notes, “Learning by doing is the
method, but it needs to be accompanied by actual mechanisms that make it
possible for regulation to move.”234
There is a useful synergy here. Medical algorithms based on observational data can themselves be improved by observing their performance and
then incorporating more data. For essentially static algorithms, this can be a
step-by-step process where, once enough data have been collected, the algorithm may be reworked and a new version distributed.235 For dynamic
black-box algorithms that flexibly update when given new data, constantly
feeding such data back into the system should help improve performance
over time.236
The idea of continuous feedback for medical algorithms meshes tightly
with the idea of a learning health system.237 In a learning health system, the
distinction between clinical research and clinical care is blurred as data
about care are folded back into the task of improving care going forward. In
the context of medical algorithms, that ongoing information can be used
both to improve the algorithms and to evaluate their performance, noting
problems or flaws as they occur.
233. Id. at 446 (“Flexibility is a key characteristic of new governance methods.”).
234. Id.
235. The analogy to alpha and beta testing of software is clear; though patients may not
appreciate being seen as alpha or beta testers, they already have this status de facto for many
medical technologies. See Jonathan J. Darrow, Crowdsourcing Clinical Trials, 98 Minn. L. Rev.
805, 809–11 (2014) (“Because risks remain and data continues to be collected, new drugs are
undergoing de facto ‘human testing’ after receiving the FDA’s seal of approval.”).
236. This idea has a parallel for physical medical devices that are incrementally changed
over the product’s lifespan, making premarket review of each iteration impractical. See Frederic S. Resnic & Sharon-Lise T. Normand, Postmarketing Surveillance of Medical Devices—Filling in the Gaps, 366 New Eng. J. Med. 875 (2012) (proposing comprehensive review of
postmarket surveillance systems to better account for the realities of device development and
evolution).
237. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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FDA has already shown a willingness to engage in this type of pre- and
postmarket blending in some contexts.238 During premarket approval review
of medical devices, the agency considers what clinical data are necessary to
establish safety and effectiveness before approval, and what data can instead
be collected postmarket.239 FDA also weighs the probable benefits and risks
of the device.240 Recognizing the challenges devices face in achieving timely
premarket approval, the agency created an Expedited Access Pathway (EAP)
program in 2015.241 Under EAP, qualified devices receive extra support and
priority review from FDA.242 To be considered for EAP, devices must “address unmet medical needs for life threatening or irreversibly debilitating
diseases or conditions.”243 When exercising premarket approval over EAP
devices, FDA is willing to accept greater upfront uncertainty regarding risks
and benefits, given the importance of patient access to these critical medical
devices.244 Instead, FDA may use more extensive postmarket controls for
EAP devices (including data collection).245
FDA’s embrace of some premarket uncertainty when evaluating EAP
devices provides a useful model for developing a similar program for medical algorithms. A limited number of algorithms might qualify under current
EAP criteria, but FDA could include a far greater number of algorithms and
allow for safe innovation by addressing complex medical algorithms specifically. The 21st Century Cures Act has laid some useful groundwork by expanding FDA’s ability to consider more types of information in postmarket

238. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Balancing Premarket and Postmarket Data Collection for Devices Subject to Premarket Approval: Guidance for Industry and
Food and Drug Administration Staff (2015) [hereinafter FDA, Balancing Premarket
and Postmarket Data Collection for Devices Subject to Premarket Approval], http:/
/www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/
ucm393994.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JTF-SYWP]; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2)(C),
360c(a)(3)(D)(ii) (2012) (enabling such balancing).
239. FDA, Balancing Premarket and Postmarket Data Collection for Devices
Subject to Premarket Approval, supra note 238, at 6–7.
240. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Factors to Consider Regarding Benefit-Risk in
Medical Device Product Availability, Compliance, and Enforcement Decisions: Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff (2016), http://
www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/
ucm506679.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VBL-MVMA].
241. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Expedited Access for Premarket Approval and De
Novo Medical Devices Intended for Unmet Medical Need for Life Threatening or Irreversibly
Debilitating Diseases or Conditions 3–4 (2015) [hereinafter FDA, Expedited Access for
Premarket Approval], http://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationand
guidance/guidancedocuments/ucm393978.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6X6-37KB].
242. Id. at 18–19.
243. Id. at 4, 9.
244. Id. at 8–9; cf. Darrow et al., supra note 183 (describing FDA’s accelerated drug approval program based on earlier-observable surrogate endpoints).
245. FDA, Expedited Access for Premarket Approval, supra note 241, at 8–9.
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surveillance activities, including “real world evidence.”246 The Act also requires that FDA “consider the role of postmarket information in determining the least burdensome means of demonstrating a reasonable assurance of
device safety and effectiveness.”247 Taken together, these provisions suggest
support for the possibility of continuous monitoring in a learning health
system, comporting with the new governance ideas of flexibility and iterative
learning.248 Along these lines, FDA is currently developing the National Evaluation System for Health Technology (NEST), intended to “generate evidence across the total product lifecycle of medical devices by strategically
and systematically leveraging real-world evidence, and applying advanced
analytics to data tailored to the unique data needs and innovation cycles of
medical devices.”249
There is a challenge with relying on postmarket surveillance; although
FDA has long had postmarket-surveillance programs, they haven’t tended to
work especially well.250 Compliance is low, especially because it is often voluntary and FDA lacks adequate enforcement resources.251 This problem
tracks the general concern described above that incremental approaches can
be sticky at the status quo—though likely not as sticky as traditional command-and-control regulation.252 So what would make postmarket surveillance work better for algorithms? Three things might help. First, Congress
could give FDA additional authority and resources to make and enforce surveillance requirements.253 Second, surveillance and monitoring should become easier as health-information systems become more integrated and data
are easier to flag and share—and FDA can itself help this integration. FDA’s
Sentinel Initiative is one step in this direction, aiming to capture safety data
from over 100 million Americans;254 broader health-information integration
246. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3022 (requiring FDA to “establish
a program to evaluate the potential use of real world evidence” to fulfill post-approval surveillance requirements). Commentators have criticized this provision. See, e.g., Jerry Avorn &
Aaron S. Kesselheim, The 21st Century Cures Act—Will It Take Us Back in Time?, 372 New
Eng. J. Med. 2473 (2015).
247. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3058(b) (amending 21 U.S.C.
§ 360(e)(c)(5)(C) (2012)).
248. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 207, at 388–400.
249. National Evaluation System for Health Technology, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., http://
www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHReports/ucm301912.htm [https://perma.cc/V9ND-XZP9].
250. See Phil B. Fontanarosa et al., Postmarketing Surveillance—Lack of Vigilance, Lack of
Trust, 292 JAMA 2647 (2004) (noting problems with postmarket surveillance system).
251. Id.
252. See Ford, supra note 232, at 470–71 (noting the difficulty of incremental change in a
new governance model); Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 819, 822 (2008) (book review) (“[In] the command-and-control
model the mechanisms for monitoring and adjusting the rules in light of experience are severely lacking.”).
253. See Resnic & Normand, supra note 236.
254. Melissa Robb, FDA’s Mini-Sentinel Exceeds 100 Million Lives (and Counting) . . . a
Major Milestone in Developing a Nationwide Rapid-Response Electronic Medical Product Safety
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should help with such surveillance, among other benefits.255 Third,
postmarket surveillance will be more effective if it involves not only FDA,
but also other sophisticated health-market actors, a topic discussed in the
next Section.
C.

Information Forcing and Collaborative Governance

To best regulate complex medical algorithms, FDA should turn to collaborative forms of governance involving other health-system actors. Collaborative governance requires information which is often now unavailable; to
enable such collaborative governance, FDA could play an information-forcing role. Both of these concepts borrow from new governance.
Jody Freeman and other new governance scholars suggest a role for collaboration by different stakeholders, including industry.256 Under this approach, regulators and other stakeholders are engaged in “continuous
interaction and sharing of responsibility.”257 This approach recognizes that
regulators lack perfect knowledge, and that others may have useful insights
to contribute.258 Although I do not suggest that FDA abdicate its commandand-control role, the agency could also play a coordinating function to enable such collaborative regulation by private actors, whether through input
to FDA actions or through their own forms of parallel regulation.259
Which actors could be involved in such collaboration? Independent verification of algorithms by third-party expert developers, relying on information used to develop the algorithms, could help buttress FDA’s own
regulation; Roger Ford and I have discussed this approach extensively elsewhere.260 But FDA can also enable real-world evaluation undertaken by
health-system actors, including providers, hospitals, and insurers. The involvement of different health-system actors carries at least two benefits.
Surveillance Program, FDA Voice (June 29, 2012), https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/
2012/06/fdas-mini-sentinel-exceeds-100-million-lives-and-counting-a-major-milestone-in-de
veloping-a-nationwide-rapid-response-electronic-medical-product-safety-surveillance-program/ [https://perma.cc/4VXQ-PXA7].
255. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting Healthcare Innovation
on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & Bioscience 3, 14–23 (2017) (describing potential innovation
benefits of health information integration).
256. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 7 (proposing a model of collaborative governance);
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (2000) (describing
regulation by private parties on behalf of agencies); Lobel, supra note 207, at 376–79 (discussing collaboration as a principle of new governance); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at
the Boundary, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 841 (2014) (describing bureaucracy at the boundary between
public and private).
257. Lobel, supra note 207, at 377.
258. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 232, at 446–47 (recognizing that “humility about
knowability” and “epistemological uncertainty” are linked to new governance).
259. See id. at 445–46.
260. See Ford & Price, supra note 68, at 30–31 (describing the benefits of independent
third-party algorithm validation and noting the challenge of balancing third-party access to
underlying data with patient privacy concerns).
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First, different actors have different areas of expertise and may interact with
algorithms in different contexts.261 Second, to the extent that collaborative
regulation invokes fears of agency capture, the involvement of health-system
actors with distinctly different incentives may help allay those concerns.262
Insurer reimbursement decisions, provider adoption, and hospital
choice can all help regulate forms of algorithmic medicine. But those forms
of parallel regulation require accurate information to function well. FDA
could enable each of these actors by requiring that those developing algorithmic medicine disclose substantial information about their algorithms
rather than keeping them totally secret.263 In the environmental context,
Bradley Karkkainen has argued that government can play an informationforcing role through penalty default rules.264 Here, I suggest instead directly
requiring information disclosure both to the regulator and to other parties.
In this framework, FDA could require as a condition of marketing that
developers disclose how the algorithm was developed, the data used for that
development, and—to the extent known—how the algorithm works. FDA
could also mediate information sharing of postmarket-surveillance information. Such mandatory sharing would likely require new statutory
authority.265
Ideally, the agency would not only help enable those private actors to
perform a private regulatory function in parallel but also learn from them in
an ongoing collaborative enterprise. Indeed, FDA has suggested that it may
be open to such an approach with respect to future regulation of laboratory261. See Lobel, supra note 207, at 379–81 (describing “diversity and competition” as key
elements of new governance).
262. See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 255, at 17–18 (discussing the different incentives of
insurers and other health-system actors).
263. Mandatory disclosure regimes have been suggested in many contexts and have come
under criticism for failing to actually meaningfully inform consumers. See, e.g., Omri BenShahar & Carl E. Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 33–54 (2014); see also Ryan Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal Architecture of
Disclosure Remains TBD, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 1021 (2015) (reviewing Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra) (arguing that some forms of disclosure may still be effective). This proposal differs
from standard disclosure regimes in that first, it would be mediated by a strong regulator; and
second, the intended users of the information are not the final consumers—patients—but
rather, other sophisticated intermediaries such as hospitals and insurers.
264. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 Fla.
St. U. L. Rev. 861, 868–71 (2006) (extending Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 91–93 (1989), to
the regulatory context).
265. This lack of statutory authority is not definite; one could argue creatively that FDA’s
authority goes that far—and the agency has been creative in its assertions of authority in the
past. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (refusing to
accept FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco products despite years of disavowing such authority).
A rigorous analysis of this issue must await future work. Some precedent for mandatory disclosure does exist. See W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics
Competition and Innovation, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1023, 1053 (2016) (discussing mandatory disclosure of manufacturing methods for biologics as part of the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act).
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developed tests, noting in a 2017 discussion paper that the agency is open to
the possibility of laboratory accreditation by third parties and promoting the
idea of “clinical collaboratives” to, among other things, “crowdsource evidence to demonstrate clinical validity for specific types of tests.”266 FDA has
also expressed some interest in exploring potential roles for third-party certification of medical software, thought it has not considered black-box algorithms explicitly.267 The next three subsections address the possibilities of
FDA engaging in collaborative regulation with providers, hospitals, and
insurers.
1. Providers
FDA-mandated information disclosure would increase the ability of
providers to exercise control over the quality of algorithms. Providers are the
traditional gatekeepers of medical technology. Providers order diagnostic
tests, prescribe drugs, and administer treatments or send patients to specialists. At least ideally, doctors, nurses, and others who provide care possess the
knowledge and training to evaluate and make choices between medical
products (though of course sometimes they may not possess or exercise this
knowledge). FDA regulation of drug-related information thus focuses on
providers; FDA states explicitly that drug labels should provide clinical information “that practitioners consider important to clinical decision making.”268 The system of medical tort law also recognizes providers’ key role in
choosing technologies through the doctrine of learned intermediaries.269

266. See FDA, Discussion Paper on LDTs, supra note 166, at 6–7.
267. Scott Gottlieb, Fostering Medical Innovation: A Plan for Digital Health Devices, FDA
Voice (June 15, 2017), https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2017/06/fostering-medical-innovation-a-plan-for-digital-health-devices/ [https://www.perma.cc/SE2D-CDY8].
268. FDA, Label Guidance, supra note 70, at 2. Off-label drugs do not have the same
information, of course. In off-label use, drugs are prescribed or administered in ways that are
not included in the drug’s label—that is, that have not been approved by FDA for use in that
particular way. See generally Understanding Unapproved Use of Approved Drugs “Off Label”,
U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (June 6, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Other/Offlabel/
default.htm [https://perma.cc/D6Z4-QS5M]. Some estimates are that off-label use may comprise 21% of all drug use. Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use: Rethinking the
Role of the FDA, 358 New Eng. J. Med. 1427 (2008) (citing David C. Radley et al., Off-Label
Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 Archives Internal Med. 1021 (2006)).
Chemotherapy is replete with off-label treatments, and many drugs are prescribed off-label for
children because manufacturers often do not conduct pediatric trials. Id.
269. Under this doctrine, the treating provider is treated as the end user of a medical
product because patients rely on the provider, not the manufacturer, and the provider can be
“reasonably rel[ied] upon to pass on the warnings.” See 2 Dan B. Dobbs et al., The Law of
Torts § 466 (2d ed. 2011). Accordingly, manufacturers owe no duty directly to the patient,
but have a duty adequately to warn the provider of potential dangers. Id. The learned intermediary doctrine is in substantial tension with the idea of complex medical algorithms. If providers cannot understand or independently reach the conclusions of an algorithm, which may fall
outside the traditional standard of care, does the provider truly fill the role of a learned intermediary? A full account of this tension must await future work.
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Currently, providers lack information about algorithms’ mechanisms or
development. Given that information—in a usable form—they could potentially help evaluate algorithm quality, much as they can do now when choosing between drugs or other treatment options.
While individual providers are traditional evaluators of medical technology, they should not be the principal evaluators of black-box algorithms.
Theoretically, individual provider decisions could mediate the quality of algorithms used and also generate ex ante market pressure for high-quality
development in the first place. But this possibility relies on both the availability of information and the ability of providers to evaluate that information. Providers are likely poorly equipped, at least for now, to directly
evaluate the quality of medical algorithms. Specialized medical associations
could, help alleviate this concern through practice guidelines, with adequate
information. For instance, the American College of Radiology, which publishes guidelines on radiology practices,270 could issue guidelines on the selection of high-quality algorithms to identify tumors in radiological
images.271 Such associations may be better at evaluating products ex ante
rather than continuing to monitor product quality after introduction, but
could potentially play either role. This collaborative governance process
could help information flow in both directions; not only would FDA mediate information disclosure to providers, but provider and provider-group
experiences and evaluations could also inform future decisions by FDA.
2. Hospital Systems
Hospitals (or larger health systems) provide another opportunity for
collaborative regulation. Hospitals are key gatekeepers for large medical systems, including information-technology systems. Hospitals may exert relatively little influence over the choice of particular drugs and medical devices,
because those choices are typically left to providers to make directly from
the set of available technologies. A substantial subset of algorithms, however,
may be embedded in or associated with larger-scale hospital equipment, or
associated with hospital information-technology and health-records systems.
In those cases, hospitals may be the principal decisionmakers in the
choice of adapting certain types of medical algorithms. Presumably, they
could take on the role of evaluating them before adoption. While hospitals
are often large and sophisticated actors, their ability to judge between different medical algorithms and to evaluate quality is currently limited by the
fact that much information is kept proprietary.272
270. See, e.g., Am. Coll. of Radiology, Best Practices Guidelines on Imaging
Clinical Decision Support Systems (2012), https://www.acr.org/~/media/ACR/Documents
/PDF/Economics/Managed-Care/Best-Practices-Guidelines-for-Imaging-Clinical-Decision-Sup
port-Systems1.pdf [https://perma.cc/58BB-YDDJ].
271. Of course, such evaluations carry the possibility of conflicting interests; the group of
professional radiologists might not welcome the task of evaluating algorithms that could automate part of their job. See, e.g., Molteni, supra note 46.
272. See supra Section II.B.
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Information sharing mediated by FDA could alleviate this concern and
allow hospitals and health systems to more effectively evaluate algorithms,
both before adoption and once they are integrated into practice. As large,
sophisticated entities that implement and run information-technology systems, hospitals may be ideally placed to help evaluate algorithms before they
are put into place.273
3. Insurers
Finally, FDA’s information-forcing role could also help enable improved
collaborative decisionmaking on the part of insurers (defined broadly) for
reimbursement purposes.274 Insurers can serve as technological gatekeepers
by deciding what technology will be reimbursed and for how much, within
limits. Often, insurers only cover new technologies if their efficacy is demonstrated.275 Without a reimbursement code, providers are much less likely to
adopt a new technology.276 Insurers’ choices therefore help determine which
technologies are adopted and which are not, consequently allowing them the
opportunity to evaluate new technology.
To be effective, insurers’ gatekeeping must account for ongoing complexities in the reimbursement of algorithms and diagnostic tests—that is,
how and whether medical algorithms are reimbursed at all, and how they are
paid for more generally.277 Nonetheless, eliding those complexities, insurers
273. See Price, supra note 75, at 13 (drawing a parallel between hospitals’ duty to select
qualified physicians and a potential duty to implement high-quality black-box medical
algorithms).
274. I use the term “insurer” for convenience, but this role could be filled by any large
final payer for medical care, whether technically an insurer or not. The broader questions of
how insurer reimbursement will work for black-box medicine are more complicated. For an
initial take, see Price, supra note 37, at 462–65.
275. Medicare, for instance, typically does not reimburse experimental medical devices
unless FDA approves the device. 42 C.F.R. § 411.15(o)(1) (2016). Since November 1995, Medicare has expanded reimbursement to include some investigational devices before they are approved, so long as they are likely to be classified as lower-risk Class I or Class II devices by
FDA, see infra Section III.A, and so long as they do not have underlying concerns regarding
their safety or effectiveness, 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.201(b), 411.15(o)(1); see also Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Pub. No. 100-02, Medicare Benefit Policy Manual, ch. 14, § 20
(2014), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/
bp102c14.pdf [https://perma.cc/43QR-497Q] (providing the criteria for approval of Medicare
coverage of Approved Investigational Device Exemption studies).
276. See Joshua P. Cohen & Abigail E. Felix, Personalized Medicine’s Bottleneck: Diagnostic
Test Evidence and Reimbursement, 4 J. Personalized Med. 163, 171–72 (2014).
277. This large issue is outside the scope of this Article, but must be addressed soon, since
the adoption of algorithms depends in large part on how they are paid for and by whom. See
Price, supra note 37, at 462–65. For some descriptions of the complexity in reimbursing diagnostic tests and personalized medicine, see, for example, Cohen & Felix, supra note 276; Eric
Faulkner et al., Challenges in the Development and Reimbursement of Personalized Medicine—
Payer and Manufacturer Perspectives and Implications for Health Economics and Outcomes Research: A Report of the ISPOR Personalized Medicine Special Interest Group, 15 Value Health
1162 (2012); Lisa M. Meckley & Peter J. Neumann, Personalized Medicine: Factors Influencing
Reimbursement, 94 Health Pol’y 91 (2010); Note, supra note 134.
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have an opportunity to ensure that the products available to providers and
patients are high quality.
Although insurers can make independent evaluations, reimbursement
decisions actually often piggyback on the decisions of regulators like FDA.278
This may be a matter of convenience: if regulators already make decisions for
many types of medical technology, insurers can rely on those decisions. But
insurers could instead serve a more powerful, independent evaluative role,
given their incentives to reduce costs and ensure efficacious treatment.279
This role might be especially important for black-box medical algorithms
that could reduce costs, either by themselves (by replacing more expensive
diagnostic methods) or by recommending more effective treatment and thus
reducing the costs of superfluous treatment.
This evaluation, however, requires information that payers don’t yet
have.280 FDA could act to reduce this information gap by requiring that developers of algorithms make their information available to payers, who
could then more easily evaluate those algorithms. FDA disclosure requirements could also obviate the need for the industry-standard practice of nondisclosure agreements surrounding the operation of medical algorithmic
technology.281 The relaxation of nondisclosure agreements about algorithmic
operation would, in turn, create the potential for information sharing by
both providers and insurers about how well algorithms actually perform in
real-world health settings. Insurers could pool knowledge that certain algorithms are low quality and not worth reimbursement or use, helping control
quality in an ongoing manner.282

278. See Michael D. Graf et al., Genetic Testing Insurance Coverage Trends: A Review of
Publicly Available Policies from the Largest U.S. Payers, 10 Personalized Med. 235 (2013);
Rachel Sachs, Your Weekly Reminder that FDA Approval and Insurance Coverage Are Often
Linked, Bill Health (Nov. 30, 2016), http://blogs.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2016/11/30/yourweekly-reminder-that-fda-approval-and-insurance-coverage-are-often-linked/ [https://
perma.cc/T8HJ-ZZJ7].
279. See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 255, at 14–15 (discussing insurers’ incentives to
innovate toward more efficient care).
280. See id. at 11–12.
281. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
282. This possibility raises the question of why insurers would be interested in sharing or
pooling such information, given the reality of competition. While a valid concern, the answer
may lie in informal disclosures mediated by health care providers. The providers who actually
observe the operation of complex medical algorithms in practice are typically reimbursed by
multiple insurers, and participate in health care settings with other providers and links to
other insurers. Thus, these providers create natural information-sharing nodes between those
entities. Nondisclosure agreements today may prevent providers from sharing information
with each other—especially across health care systems—but if those agreements are removed,
informal information sharing becomes much more likely. In the presence of informal information sharing, then, between providers and insurers, participating more formally to systematize such knowledge might be more palatable, especially if the result is the elimination of
payments for low-quality algorithms and an emphasis on higher-quality algorithms.
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D. Setting the Right Balance
The challenge across the board with information forcing by FDA as a
mechanism of enabling collaborative governance is, of course, that it limits
the ability of algorithm developers to protect the value of their algorithms by
keeping them secret. This implicates concerns further from the new governance movement, instead touching on how challenges from such regulation
may interact with incentive mechanisms or political economy concerns. In
particular, as I have discussed elsewhere, secrecy is a potentially important
mechanism to provide ex post appropriability (that is, allowing innovators
to capture the social value of an innovation) and therefore to provide ex ante
incentives for the development of new medical algorithms.283
But secrecy is a problem for flexible multifaceted regulation of new technology. FDA can only do so much, and its traditional tools of premarket
approval may well hinder innovation more than the lack of appropriability
through keeping methods secret, though this is a contestable empirical question. Silicon Valley itself demonstrates this dynamic, citing as a major
holdup not the inability to keep technology proprietary for long—for
software can be reverse engineered and recoded in many circumstances, and
proprietary appropriation incentives can be replaced by first-mover advantage and network effects—but rather the long and slow process of slogging
through regulatory hurdles to reach market in the first place.284 A disclosure
mechanism that would decrease those regulatory delays might well be regarded as a good trade by many innovators, especially if the disclosure were
shaped to preserve incentives where possible.285
How might disclosure best be shaped to preserve incentives? The simplest feature might be a delay in disclosure, which enables fast-moving firms
to obtain first-mover advantages and to build network effects before potential competitors can see the disclosed technology—though this also delays
the possibility of collaborative oversight by other health market actors.286
Other more stringent restrictions could be developed as contractual restrictions on access to data through an FDA intermediary; for instance, data
could be examined, but not used as the basis for further algorithms.287 This
arrangement already exists in the context of drug clinical-trial data, where
some drug research firms permit access to data from their clinical trials on
283. See Price, supra note 15, at 1432–36.
284. See Associated Press, supra note 140.
285. See W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 Wash. L. Rev. 1769, 1808–12
(2016) (describing this possible tradeoff).
286. In a parallel situation, patent applications are disclosed 18 months after filing; this
gives competitors access to some technical information that they could use to invent-around
the patent, but preserves a substantial lead time for the first inventor. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)
(2012).
287. This arrangement would, by design, decrease the ability of other firms to generate
precisely those later algorithms, which we might otherwise find desirable. In other work, I
have suggested an infrastructure model of health big data to facilitate just such cumulative
innovation. Price, supra note 15, at 1439–44.
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the condition that such data not be used as the foundation of a regulatory
filing for a competing product.288 This does not remove all potential competitive harm, of course, but it helps limit the most obvious type of imitation.289 Another answer, put briefly, recognizes that disclosure decreases
some innovation incentives, and that offsetting incentives must be put into
place to counteract this decrease, whether in the form of other appropriability mechanisms (patents or regulatory exclusivity) or direct incentives (grants, prizes, or tax incentives).290
An additional direction to enable innovation incentives might address
decreasing the costs of innovation rather than trying to increase the rewards
through appropriability or direct monetary subsidies. In particular, helping
reduce the costs of data assembly and quality could enable the far easier
development of medical algorithms.291 Broad databases of health data,
whether developed directly by public entities or by public-private partnerships, might serve as a form of innovation infrastructure allowing for easier
development of medical algorithms while reducing the need for costly initial
investments.292
Complicating matters, since trade secrets have traditionally been protected as state property interests, retroactive disclosure of trade secrecy could
arguably be a government taking requiring compensation.293 This problem
would likely be avoidable in prospective regulation, since developers would
lack the “reasonable investment-backed expectation” that this type of information could be kept as a trade secret.294 Since complex medical algorithms
are still a young science, moving to require such prospective disclosure relatively early might still govern the majority of algorithms.
288. See, e.g., Inst. of Med. of the Nat’l Acads., Sharing Clinical Trial Data: Maximizing Benefits, Minimizing Risk 147–48 (2015).
289. For instance, information about what does not work can be tremendously valuable,
and is difficult to appropriate in any fashion other than secrecy. Amy Kapczynski & Talha
Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 Yale L.J. 1900, 1923–29
(2013). At least one counterargument to firms’ desire for trade secrecy, then could be that it is
a waste of social resources to replicate paths that others already know will fail, and that avoiding such waste might be more important than maintaining some types of corporate competitive advantage.
290. See Price, supra note 15, at 1418–19 (discussing incentive challenges for black-box
medicine).
291. See id. at 1439–44.
292. Id.
293. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (holding that EPA-required
disclosure of pesticide regulatory filings were a taking when the filing company had reasonable
expectations based in statute that the filings would not be disclosed); see also Price, supra note
285, at 1808–09 (describing takings barriers to mandatory regulatory disclosure).
294. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005 (quoting Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)); see also id. at 1005–07 (“[A]s long as [someone submitting data] is
aware of the conditions under which the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally
related to a legitimate Government interest, a voluntary submission of data by an applicant in
exchange for the economic advantages of a registration can hardly be called a taking.”).
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Setting the appropriate balance between regulatory oversight—particularly oversight based on disclosure to allow participation by nongovernment
actors—and innovation incentives is a challenging task. Requiring disclosure
to enable third-party sources of oversight reduces some incentives, to be
certain, but so does the imposition of slow, costly regulatory barriers to
market entry. And the absence of any regulation itself hinders innovation by
removing markers of quality and fostering consumer distrust in a burgeoning industry that depends very much on trust.295
The tools of new governance do not solve these problems, but they suggest paths for fruitful movement forward. FDA could benefit by following a
flexible, incremental model relying on lighter up-front preapproval hurdles
and more substantial premarket surveillance. Such an approach should ideally involve collaborative efforts with other health-system stakeholders.
Conclusion
Algorithms are rapidly changing the way medicine is practiced today
and have the potential to even more quickly change practice in the future.
They promise increases in efficiency, quality of care, and the precision with
which interventions are targeted to individual patients. But black-box algorithms also bring substantial risks, where low-quality algorithms may recommend dangerous interventions without the long-available checks of
explicit understanding or clinical trials. As the field explodes with possibilities, regulation is needed to allow providers, patients, and insurers to choose
wisely from a wealth of options of varying quality.
Figuring out how best to regulate opaque, changing algorithms will not
be easy. Such regulation will need to involve flexibility, collaboration among
the agency and other stakeholders, and a willingness to reevaluate regulatory
strategies in the face of changing technology. FDA standing alone as regulator runs the risk of stifling innovation, which bears its own cost in missed
opportunity—and might not even ensure safety for all that. Black-box algorithms create a new context for the familiar debate about speed of access
against the desire to ensure safety and quality. But the technology is fundamentally different, not least because speed and flexibility of development are
a large part of what black-box medicine brings to the table. FDA’s role
should reflect this change by acknowledging that premarket controls can
only do so much to ensure quality in opaque algorithmic systems. FDA’s
own oversight of real-world quality markers can help regulate quality after
market entry. But FDA should also welcome help by acting to remove the
veil of secrecy on commercial medical algorithms and enabling collaborative
regulation by providers, hospitals, and health care payers. Such a regulatory
role can help induce, and can later rely on, integrated health information
systems to monitor real-time performance and quality.296
295. Cortez, FDA Regulation of Mobile Health, supra note 27, at 374.
296. FDA’s Sentinel system was built off a mandate to better surveil drug safety after
approval, and represents a substantial step for integrating health data. See Eisenberg & Price,
supra note 255, at 40–42.
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More broadly, black-box algorithms are not limited to medicine. Machine learning and artificial intelligence are buzzwords of modern technological development, representing the next step in using big data across
whatever areas are available. And while medicine may be especially salient,
machine-learning algorithms create risks and benefits that will need to be
addressed, measured, and regulated in many contexts.297 How should the
NHTSA regulate machine-learning algorithms involved in self-driving
cars?298 How should police use machine-learning algorithms and big data to
help prevent crime, and how can we ensure that those algorithms are highquality and free from bias?299 How can the SEC limit the risk that machinelearning trading algorithms will crash the stock market,300 or the FTC the
risk that opaque pricing algorithms will discriminate unacceptably against
different buyers?301 Perhaps closer to home, who can regulate the quality of
machine-learning systems involved in legal practice?302
More generally, how should agencies—or private parties—ensure the
quality of algorithms that are opaque and mutable? These are not easy questions, and they do not have easy answers. I have suggested here that, at least
in the context of FDA and black-box medical algorithms, an answer may be
a combination of flexibility, the establishment of mechanisms for ongoing,
real-world performance monitoring, and the enablement of collaborative
governance mechanisms with other sophisticated stakeholders. This prescription is not a panacea. But it is a start.
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